Background & Objectives

The 1st Joint Workshop in October 2007 initiated a major annual academic event for the Jeju Peace Institute and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom. Successive Joint Workshops have focused on the lessons of regional cooperation and integration from a European experience that might be applicable to East Asian multilateral approaches. In an attempt to find a breakthrough for multilateral cooperation in East Asia, the 10th Joint Workshop Trust-Building Process Step by Step will facilitate the idea of peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula through cooperation and dialogue. This workshop will specifically focus on German past experience that can be applied to utilize the DMZ as a starting point for reunification.

The Park Geun-hye administration launched a several multilateral cooperation initiatives, such as the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative, Eurasia Initiative, and Trust-Building Process for the preparation of Korean unification. In order to initiate a multilateral cooperation and to connect South Korea to the Eurasian continent, South Korea needs to achieve peaceful inter-Korean relationships as a preliminary condition. With the cooperative relations with North Korea, South Korea extends its scope of cooperative measures to the connection of Trans-Korean Railway (TKR), a natural gas pipeline from Russia, and a tourist exchange program. South Korea considers the cooperation a rehearsal-run for reunification, to test how far collaboration between South and North Korea can reach in facilitating mutual and common interest. Inter-Korean cooperation is related to security rather than to economy and development; therefore, South Korea has to consider cooperation from a regional security point of view.
This workshop will discuss the theoretical and practical aspects of inter-Korean cooperation and utilization of the DMZ as a policy tool to pursue Korean reunification. The first session will focus on the lessons of the German unification and the preparation of Korean unification. The second session will deal Korean approaches of utilizing DMZ: Kaesong industrial complex and DMZ world eco-peace park. It also covers the application of European multilateral approaches on East Asia for the facilitation of regional cooperation and the creation of a multilateral cooperative mechanism for East Asia. The workshop will discuss:

- Two States-One Nation? East and West Germany in the Years of the Cold War
- How to Keep the Willingness of South Korea’s Society for Unification
- The Characteristics of a Development of the DMZ to a Symbol of Ecology, Prosperity and Peace
- Further Special Administrative Industrial Region, Kaesong as a Role Model
- DMZ World Eco-Peace Park and Transboundary Conservation as a Start of Cooperation, Peace and Exchange
- OSCE in Northeast Asia.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>09:15-09:30</td>
<td>Registration</td>
<td>09:15-09:30</td>
<td>Registration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09:30-10:00</td>
<td>Opening Session</td>
<td>09:30-10:00</td>
<td>Opening Session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10:00-12:30</td>
<td>Session I: Lessons from the Past for Unification</td>
<td>10:00-12:30</td>
<td>Luncheon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14:00-17:30</td>
<td>Session II: Cooperation for Trust-Building</td>
<td>14:00-17:00</td>
<td>Closing Session</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17:30-18:00</td>
<td>Welcoming Dinner</td>
<td>17:00-17:30</td>
<td>Farewell Dinner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:00-21:00</td>
<td></td>
<td>17:30-19:30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
09:30 -10:00  OPENING SESSION: Unification and DMZ

09:30 -09:40  OPENING REMARKS
Amb. MOON Tae-Young, President, Jeju Peace Institute

CONGRATULATORY REMARKS
Dr. Lars-André RICHTER, Resident Representative, Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom Korea Office

09:40 -10:00  KEYNOTE SPEECH
Dr. PARK Jin, President, Asia Future Institute

SPEAKERS

H.E. MOON Tae-Young, President, Jeju Peace Institute
Amb. MOON Tae-Young has been president of the Jeju Peace Institute since October 2012. He graduated from Seoul National University in 1978 (BA in Linguistics) and studied a Master's course at Johns Hopkins University (MA in International Relations). He started his career as a diplomat in 1978. He has held positions as Deputy Spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) (1997-1999), Ambassador to the Republic of Panama (2004-2006), Director General for Asian & Pacific Studies, IFANS, MOFAT (2007), Spokesman & Deputy Minister for Public Relations of MOFAT (2008-2009), and Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (2010-2012).

Dr. Lars-André RICHTER, Resident Representative, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in Korea
Dr. Lars-André RICHTER is the Resident Representative of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom in Korea since June 2012. He studied German Literature, Philosophy and History in Tübingen, Leipzig, Paris (Paris III – Sorbonne Nouvelle) and Berlin. He earned his Ph.D from Humboldt University in Berlin in 2008 with doctoral dissertation on the Weimar Republic. He has been working for the FNF since 2008: at first he served as Press Officer and Deputy Spokesman at the Foundation’s headquarters in Potsdam before the current post. Prior to joining FNF, he also worked for the DAAD (Deutscher Akademische Austauschdienst/German Academic Exchange Service), as well as in Mexico-City, and later for WELT ONLINE which is the online edition of the German daily newspaper “Die Welt”.

Dr. PARK Jin, President, Asia Future Institute
Dr. PARK Jin is currently a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson international Center for Scholars and Chair Professor at the Graduate School of International and Area Studies
of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He is also working as the President of Asia Future Institute, an independent policy think-tank designed to conduct research on the future development of Asia and to promote Korea's role in the region. Dr. Park served in the 16th, 17th, and 18th Sessions of the National Assembly, representing the Grand National Party (renamed to Saenuri Party) in the central Jongno District in Seoul. While in politics, he served as the Chairman of Foreign Affairs, Trade and National Unification Committee of the National Assembly during 2008-2010 period. In that capacity, he passed the KORUS FTA, North Korea Human Rights Act, ODA Law and PKO Law in his own committee. He graduated from the College of law at Seoul National University, Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, New York University Law School and received a doctorate degree in politics from St. Antony's College, Oxford University. He is currently the President of Korea-Britain Society, Vice President of Korea-America Association, a member of the New York State Bar and a regular member of the Seoul Forum for International Affairs.
10:00-12:30 SESSION I: Lessons from the Past for Unification

**Moderator**  Mr. Sören KITTEL, Journalist

**10:00-11:30 PRESENTATIONS**

1) Two States – One Nation? East and West Germany in the Years of the Cold War  
Dr. Stefan WOLLE, Research Director, GDR Museum Berlin

2) How to Keep the Willingness of South Korea’s Society for Unification  
Dr. PARK Sang-Bong, Former President, Institute for Unification Education

3) The Characteristics of a Development of the DMZ to a Symbol of Ecology, Prosperity and Peace  
Dr. HUR Joon-Young, Associate Research Fellow, Korea Institute of Public Administration

**11:30-12:30 DISCUSSIONS**

**12:30-14:00 LUNCHEON**
MODERATOR

Mr. Sören KITTEL, Journalist
Mr. Sören KITTEL was born 1978 in Dresden, former German Democratic Republic, and began to work as a journalist shortly after the wall came down at a student magazine in his hometown. After graduating in 1997, he studied in Leipzig, Amsterdam and Berlin Anthropology, Economy and South East Asian Studies. He joined the Axel Springer Academy for a journalistic educational program (one of the most well-known program in the field) in 2007. In 2009 he became a local news reporter in Berlin for the national paper “Die Welt” and “Berliner Morgenpost”. He also had various media related experiences in other international cities like Beijing (2006), Nairobi (2008), Jakarta (2010) and finally Seoul (2013). Since summer 2014, he is a freelance journalist in Seoul for different German magazines, writing about Korean politics, culture and economy.

PRESENTERS

Dr. Stefan WOLLE, GDR Museum Berlin
Dr. Stefan WOLLE is Research Director of the GDR Museum Berlin since 2006. After the fall of the Berlin Wall he became a specialist for the files of the Ministry of State Security (State Security Service or “Stasi”) at the Central Round Table Talks, a member of the Committee for the Dissolution of the Ministry for State Security, and worked with the Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic. From 1998 to 2000, he worked with the Federal Foundation for the Reappraisal of the SED Dictatorship and since 2002, he is the member of the Research Group on the East German Communist State at the Free University of Berlin (FU).

Dr. PARK Sang-Bong, Former President, Institute for Unification Education
Dr. PARK Sang-Bong is the Head of German Research Institute. He is also the member of the Advisory Committee for the Group of National Assembly Members for Opening Unification and the Educational Director of Association for Advanced Unification. In 2008, he served as the President of the Institute of Unification Education, Ministry of Unification. He is the Founding Member and the Editor of the weekly magazine ‘Future Korea’ and performed as a host at the radio programs “Towards to Unification” on FEBC and “Radio Special Lecture” on EBS. He graduated Yonsei University and finished his Master at the School of Business and Economics, Berlin Free University.

Dr. HUR Joon-Young, Korea Institute of Public Administration
Dr. HUR Joon-Young is a Coordinator of Social Cohesion Team at the Korea Institute of Public Administration (KIIPA). He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science (Otto-Suhr Institute) from the Free University of Berlin. He received an M.A. and completed Ph.D. course work in Public Administration at Seoul National University. He is currently serving as a committee member for conflict management forum at the Presidential Committee for National Cohesion. His research interests include integration policy, disaster management, and security policy with capacity building programs for North Korean. He is the author of Die Integration ostdeutscher Flüchtlinge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland durch Beruf und Qualifikation. He has also written a book chapter on “From Communist Cadres into Capitalistic Managers?: The Case of Western Business Schools – Pyongyang and Rajin-Sonbong” and numerous articles.
Session II

14:00-17:00 SESSION II: Cooperation for Trust-Building

Moderator: Dr. SON Gi-Woong, Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification

14:00 -15:30 PRESENTATIONS
1) Further Special Administrative Industrial Regions, Kaesong as a Role Model
   Dr. YANG Chang-Seok, Auditor, Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation

2) DMZ World Eco-Peace Park and Transboundary Conservation as a Start of Cooperation, Peace and Exchange
   Dr. PARK Eun-Jin, Head of Future Planning, National Institute of Ecology

3) OSCE in Northeast Asia?
   Dr. Dorjraa MUNKHTUR, Chief, Institute for Strategic Studies, Mongolia

15:30-16:00 COFFEE BREAK

16:00-17:00 DISCUSSIONS

17:00-17:30 CLOSING SESSION

17:30-19:30 FAREWELL DINNER
MODERATOR

Dr. SON Gi-Woong, Korea Institute for National Unification
Dr. SON Gi-Woong is Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) and also serving as President of the Korean Association of DMZ Studies, Vice-President of the Korean Political Science Association, Vice-President of the Korean Association of International Studies, Co-Chairman of the Korea DMZ Council and Adjunct Professor of the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He was also Associate Fellow, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, England. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Free University of Berlin, Germany. His current research areas include Unification Policy, Peace Research, Environmental and Energy Cooperation. He is author of "Reunification, The Way We Must Walk Which We Never Did"(2015), "Green Detent: Meaning and Implement Strategy"(2014), "Analysis of EC/EU and the Methods for Establishing South-North Korean and Northeast Asian Community 1, 2, 3"(2012, 2013, 2014), "Peaceful Use of the DMZ as a National Strategy 1, 2, 3"(2011, 2012, 2013), "Unification of Germany: Issues and Tasks"(2009).

PRESENTERS

Dr. YANG Chang-Seok, Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation
Dr. YANG Chang-Seok is auditor for the Kaesong Industrial District Foundation and former deputy minister for South-North Dialogue at the Ministry of Unification. Prior Dr. Yang served as the Ministry’s deputy minister for planning and coordination, special representative for Inter-Korean Dialogue, director-general of the Bureau of Intelligence and Analysis, director-general of the Bureau of Social and Cultural Exchanges, and Spokesperson. Earlier, he served as the Unification Ministry’s deputy director-general of the Information Analysis Bureau and director of the International Cooperation Division. Dr. Yang served as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) deputy director for Policy and DPRK Affairs, director for Policy Coordination in the Office of Planning for the Light Water Reactor Project, and first secretary (Unification Affairs) at the Korean Embassy in Washington, DC. Prior, he was assistant to the Unification Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, and director of the Unification Planning Policy Division of the Unification Ministry. He was head of the ROK delegation on a cooperative research project in Bonn, unification attaché at the Korean Embassy in Germany, and deputy spokesman for the Unification Ministry. He was deputy director in various Unification Ministry divisions in the 1980s. Dr. Yang has visited North Korea more than fifty times, including for KEDO-DPRK negotiations, and is author of Brandenburg Memoirs: Testimony by Key Players for German Unification (Neulpum Plus, 2011). Dr. Yang holds a BA in Economics from Gyungbook National University, an MA in Russian Politics from the London School of Economics, and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Dankook University.

Dr. PARK Eun-Jin, National Institute of Ecology
Dr. PARK Eun-Jin is Head of Future Planning in the National Institute of Ecology. She studied biology at undergraduate in Seoul National University and received her PhD from the Graduate School of Environmental Studies in Seoul National University and added up research experience on carbon sequestration in soils for mitigation of climate change as a research associate at Michigan State University. She also conducted researches on environmental policy and sustainable development as a research fellow at Gyeonggi Research Institute. She is now conducting studies focused on the
establishment of the DMZ Peace Park, designation and management of the DMZ as a biosphere reserve, and sustainable development policy and ecosystem services. Her work includes, ‘The Conservation Value of Major Resources in the Korean DMZ area (2010)’, ‘Management Framework for the Korea DMZ Biosphere Reserve (2012)’, and ‘Whispers of the DMZ (2013)’.

**Dr. Dorjraa MUNKHTUR, Institute for Strategic Studies, Mongolia**

Dr. Dorjraa MUNKHTUR, joined the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia as a researcher in 2010. Currently, he is the Head of the Center for Europe and North American Studies at the Institute for Strategic Studies of Mongolia. Before he joined the Institute he graduated from Westphalian Wilhelm University of Muenster in Germany and obtained Doctor of Philosophy on the subject “Protecting Foreign Direct Investment from Political Risks through International Law”. D. Munkhtur’s research focuses are on the security of the Euro-Atlantic region, OSCE, and NATO.

Dr. Munkhtur worked and finished a number of research projects such as “The Third Neighbor Policy of Mongolia”, “International Regulation for Private Military and Security Companies”, “Threat Perceptions in the OSCE Area” and “NATO Global Perceptions in Asia Pacific”. In 2013 he was a Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation Visiting Fellow with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support of UN at the United Nations Headquarter in New York. His works were published in Mongolian, English and German in various domestic and international journals.
OPENING SESSION
Unification and DMZ
(09:30-10:00)

Opening Remarks
Amb. MOON Tae-Young
President, Jeju Peace Institute

Congratulatory Remarks
Dr. Lars-André RICHTER
Resident Representative, Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom Korea Office

Keynote Speech
Dr. PARK Jin
President, Asia Future Institute
Creating a Détente-Making Zone on the Hostile Inter-Korean Border

Dr. PARK Jin
President, Asia Future Institute

Korea is known as the “land of the Morning Calm”. The old name of the nation “Chosun” literally signifies the peaceful nature of the country. But the border between the two Koreas remains a stark symbol of the last legacy of the Cold War in the 21st century. The 155-mile border area in the middle of the Korean Peninsula is known as the DMZ of the demilitarized zone which has been in place for dividing the country over six decades. Korea will have to wait for an eventual unification of the country for a certain period of time because of hostile national division. But the DMZ in the meantime could be turned into a “Detent-Making Zone” by creating a World Eco-Peace Park. If this idea is realized, then the Korean Peninsula will be able to move toward a peaceful and gradual integration.

The inter-Korean relations remain fragile and unpredictable. Following an artillery provocation against the South on 20th August, North Korea further escalated the tension on the Korean Peninsula by declaring a “quasi-state of war” and ordering its military to be fully battle-ready. Fortunately, the two Koreas managed to sit down for a marathon high-level talk at Panmunjeom. As a result, the Kim regime finally agreed to express regret over the mine explosion in DMZ on 4th August which left South Korean soldiers wounded; in return, the South turned off its loudspeakers which had been delivering broadcast across the border. And the two Koreas have also agreed to pursue dialogue and negotiation in many areas. Thus the Korean Peninsula has turned at once from confrontation to dialogue. That North Korea has
openly expressed regret over their provocation is regarded as an important milestone in inter-Korean relations. Of course, it still remains to be seen if North Korea will keep their words.

The Park Geun-hye government has sought to improve inter-Korean relations and facilitate peaceful cooperation through the Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula. On one hand, in the face of continued security threats from North Korea such as nuclear tests and missile launches, South Korea has responded through international cooperation such as UNSC resolution to sanction North Korea; on the other, an offer of dialogue and cooperation for peaceful coexistence has always remained. President Park put forward three proposals during her speech in Dresden, Germany, in March 2014; first, to resolve humanitarian issues in inter-Korean relations as a priority: second, to build infrastructure for co-prosperity; third, to pursue integration between the people of South and North Korea.

President Park declared the conception of the DMZ World Eco-Peace Park in her address to a joint meeting of the United States Congress on May 8, 2013. The idea is to make the park to be the stage in which not only the countries and the people who once fiercely fought each other but also the people in the world who desire peace can harmonize and interact together. The proposal intends to keep this region that has recovered on its own, after having once been ruined by humans, as a well-preserved ecosystem, a space where human being and nature can co-exist. It is a creative peace initiative based on the ecological consideration.

The DMZ World Eco-Peace Park initiative is based on the theory of limited peace zone. The DMZ, in reality, does not perform the duties inherent to a peaceful area. By transforming some areas within the DMZ to a peace zone by agreement and creating an ecological park, the plan intends to partially mend the broken peace and to expand the peace zone across the Korean Peninsula in the mid-to-long term.

The DMZ was originally conceived to avoid military clashes, but the region is in reality heavily armed and threatened with unceasing conflict and confrontation. The most recent explosion of the wooden-box mines in the DMZ area to the South is a good example of
such a military conflict. Considering that peace even in a limited area has not been credible due to the entrenched political and military confrontation, securing some parts of the DMZ for a peace zone could be an effective measure to practically build and extend peace in the dangerous region.

Therefore, various types of peace zones need to be studied in the process of establishing a sustainable peace regime between the two Koreas. The peace park project is a genuine example of such an action. It proposes to turn particular areas within the DMZ into a peace zone by creating a park for peaceful purposes and using it as a basis for extending this peace to the entire DMZ and thereby constructing a stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula in the long term.

The DMZ World Eco-Peace Park will have to meet the interests of the two Koreas in order to prove practicable. Considering that North and South Korea share political, military, economic, cultural, and environmental interests in the DMZ, a convincing theory indicating that the DMZ peace park can satisfy the national interests of both sides needs to be developed for active promotion and persuasion.

The DMZ World Eco-Peace Park should also display that it is responding to the interests of the international community as well. Since the DMZ narrowly represents the interest of the parties of the armistice agreement, the United States and China, and in a broader view, the United Nations and the international community, appropriate reasons need to be sought for positive promotion and persuasion in convincing each of these members that their interests are also accounted for. In the political, military, economic, cultural, and environmental aspects, the DMZ park initiative will be able to get support from the international community only if it succeeds in persuading the world that it also meets the interests of the international community.

The support of the international community will work as a strong momentum to carry out the project and again as leverage to continue the plan. A convincing message should be sent out that the park will become a neutral and safe space bringing peace, harmony,
mutual trust, and cooperation between the two Koreas and also, reaching beyond the Korean Peninsula, that it will be a space to increase peace, co-prosperity, international amity, and good neighborhood in Northeast Asia.

The future of the Korean Peninsula depends on Korean unification. And in order to move toward unification, we need to start with “small steps”. Building a World Eco-Peace Park in the DMZ will surely contribute to the closer communication, tension reduction, and gradual integration of two Korean economies. When the two Koreas are economically integrated, the South’s technology and capital will be combined with the North’s resources and workforce to bring about a substantial economic synergy. The integration will not only contribute to peace and prosperity for the peninsula but also help create a new Northeast Asian economic community. And through this process, North Korea will have to undergo change. They must leave behind their closed reclusive totalitarianism and malfunctioning planned economy; they must learn lessons from China or Vietnam which have developed their own socialist market economy models. That change in turn will improve inter-Korean relations; indeed, an inter-Korean economic community would be a precursor to full and complete unification.

The DMZ World Eco-Peace Park proposal is an innovative strategy with creativity, courage, and determination to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and improve inter-Korean relations. Without having an agreement of making and using the DMZ peacefully, inter-Korean relations will not be able to escape from the vicious circle of rising hopes, broken promises, military tension and strained relationship. Considering all of the lessons learned from the past, the project should be promoted with prudence and patience, waiting for North Korea to respond, instead of giving it up and being critical about it.

It is important to recognize that the DMZ peace park idea is aimed at building peace on the Korean Peninsula, constructing groundwork for unification, cooperation for peace in Northeast Asia, and promotion of global peace and prosperity. More active domestic and international discussions should be provided so that the park project can be conceptualized to make it a stepping stone for the inter-Korean communication and for the preparation and
Germany achieved its own historic unification 25 years ago and now leads the future of Europe in the 21st century. The German unification was made possible by the East German people themselves who chose freedom and unification and there was also consistent Ostpolitik of the West German government. It must be noted that, structurally and historically, what we have on the Korean Peninsula is rather different to what they had in Berlin and across Germany. There exist, however, some lessons we can learn from the German case. First, we need consistent efforts to maintain dialogue, exchange and cooperation wherever and whenever possible. This will maintain peace and stability while reducing tension and restoring commonality. Second, like the people of East Germany, the North Korean people must choose freedom and unification themselves. For this, North Korean people should have more access to outside information. This is not just a matter of changing the regime in Pyongyang; the people there must embrace liberal democracy and free market to welcome peaceful unification. Third, we must recognize that unification can come at the most unexpected of times. Therefore, we must be prepared to deal with the burden of unification. Politically, economically and socially united Korea will be able to make significant contributions to the peace and prosperity of the region as well as to global security.

Creating a “Detent-Making Zone” on the hostile inter-Korean border is an expression of South Korea's strong will for building peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The Eco-Peace Park in a confrontational area comprehensively represents peace among people as well as one between humans and nature. The park is a place which can promote not only inter-Korean reconciliation, trust, and cooperation but also peace and shared prosperity in Northeast Asia and international amity and good-neighborliness. If the World Eco-Peace Park can become a place for an enduring peace of which Korea can be proud before the world, the park itself will become an asset of national culture for future generations.

In this context North and South Korea as well as the international community should join forces to build a World Eco-Peace Park in the DMZ as a symbolic monument to the
opening of an era of peace in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. This will certainly facilitate the Korean Peninsula Trust-Building Process and the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative.
SESSION I
Lessons from the Past for Unification
(10:00-12:30)

Moderator:
Mr. Sören KITTEL
Journalist

Presentations:

“Two States – One Nation? East and West Germany in the Years of the Cold War”
Dr. Stefan WOLLE
Research Director, GDR Museum Berlin

“How to Keep the Willingness of South Korea’s Society for Unification”
Dr. PARK Sang-Bong
Former President, Institute for Unification Education

“The Characteristics of a Development of the DMZ to a Symbol of Ecology, Prosperity and Peace”
Dr. HUR Joon-Young
Associate Research Fellow, Korea Institute of Public Administration
Two States - One Nation?

_East and West Germany in the Years of the Cold War_

Dr. Stefan WOLLE
Research Director, GDR Museum Berlin

1. From the politics of confrontation to "change through rapprochement" (1961 to 1969)

On 13 August 1961 the GDR closed all access routes to West Berlin, thus ending the mass exodus of GDR citizens to the West. Essentially, it had no other choice if it was to prevent the state from collapse. The West was utterly outraged and yet the western Allies limited their actions to verbal protests. Their rights in Berlin were not curtailed by the building of the Wall and neither the West Berlin access routes nor political order in West Berlin were affected.

The Wall illustrated the brutality of communism and its disregard for humanity, but it also showed that a policy of confrontation would not change anything. The death of Peter Fechter highlighted the situation. A young man died in the death strip before the eyes of West Berliners. The American soldiers did not intervene. It became clear at the time that protests and outrage would make the Wall increasingly insurmountable.

A new policy emanated from Berlin, the very place where the brutality of the division in the world was at its most obvious. Egon Bahr, Willy Brandt's press spokesman, formulated the policy of "change through rapprochement" in a speech made in 1963. The core idea was
that resolving the split in Germany was a long process which would also have to accept the interests of the other side. The most important thing of all was to maintain human relationships. The "policy of small steps" thus began.

The first successful step was the border pass agreement between the West Berlin senate and the GDR. It allowed people to visit relatives in the East for the first time at Christmas 1963. 700,000 West Berliners made 1,200,000 visits. This was a tremendous demonstration of Berliners' desire for unity. The price was the recognition of the GDR government as a negotiating partner. The absurd position of the Bonn government in maintaining that the GDR did not exist was subject to renegotiation.

2. The new Ostpolitik under the government of Willy Brandt and the normalisation of German-German relations (1969 to 1973)

When Willy Brandt became Federal Chancellor in 1969, it signalled the beginning of the new Ostpolitik which opened the way for relations between the GDR and the Federal Republic to be normalised. At its centre was reconciliation with the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia, i.e. the recognition of post-war borders and renunciation of any revision of the status quo. On the subject of German unity, in his inaugural address Willy Brandt said: "Even if two states exist in Germany, they are not foreign countries to each other." How right Willy Brandt was in saying this became clear on his first visit to the GDR. Brandt met Willi Stoph, the Prime Minister of the GDR, in Erfurt in Thuringia. A huge crowd of people gathered outside the hotel to cheer the Federal Chancellor. The people hoped that Willy Brandt would take decisive steps to improve the situation. This heaped shame on the GDR and further intra-German negotiations became difficult as a result. Detente nevertheless made great advances. The Soviet Union and the Federal Republic signed a non-aggression pact in Moscow. The Federal Republic recognised the borders of 1945 in Warsaw. This led to ferocious attacks by the CDU/CSU opposition parties and the attempt to overthrow Willy Brandt.

But the world powers also started talking. They signed an agreement on Berlin that guaranteed a legally secured status for West Berlin. This paved the way for a similar
agreement between the FRG and the GDR. After protracted negotiations the Basic Treaty was finally signed. There were now two sovereign German states under international law, but they were to have a special relationship with each other. The formula drawn up in 1969 had thus become a reality. There were two states and one nation. But what did this "one nation" mean for the people in the East and West?

3. The consequences of detente policy for the internal situation in the GDR (1974 to 1988)

When the Basic Treaty was being concluded in Berlin the entire city centre had been transformed into a ghost town. A repetition of the events in Erfurt had to be avoided at all costs. At first glance, the treaty was a complete triumph for the GDR. It was a sovereign and internationally recognised state at long last. Both German states acceded to the UN at the same time. The GDR was recognised by all western states, including Great Britain, France and the USA. The existence of the GDR now appeared to be secure once and for all, and the division cemented for an incalculable period of time. Yet it was this very stability and security whose increase undermined the existence of the GDR in the long term. The separate East German state was a child of the Cold War. The icier the wind of confrontation blew, the safer was the existence of the GDR. Every thaw threatened to melt the foundations of German separation, however. This all sounds very abstract so here are a few examples:

The opening in East Berlin of offices belonging to the West German television service and West German newspapers was very important. They were able to send live reports directly from East Berlin – even on opposition activities and the detention of people applying to leave, and even on day-to-day living conditions in the GDR. There were no more secrets behind the curtain in the East.

It became easier to visit the East. West Berliners could now arrive on a day visa and stay for up to 24 hours. A few citizens of the GDR were also able to visit the West now. Visits for special family occasions were now possible, for example a wedding, a birthday or the death of an immediate relative. Such trips could be refused by the authorities without
giving any reasons, but it was no longer impossible to travel to the West. And people who used to be in the West were now asking why it was not possible all the time.

Pensioners were now able to travel virtually without restriction and brought back highly coveted gifts from the West. Postal traffic also increased and telephone calls between East and West were even possible, albeit somewhat difficult.

The Final Act of Helsinki in 1975 accelerated this creeping process of undermining the GDR's right to exist. The document was also published in the GDR. However, East German citizens were used to the incontestable truth appearing in the newspapers. Nevertheless, more and more people plucked up the courage to go to the responsible authority, brandish their newspaper and point out the relevant paragraphs guaranteeing that everyone was free to leave. The GDR authorities permitted some people to leave in order to ease some of the pressure – and achieved the opposite effect. Each person left behind a hole in the fence.

The East German leadership made every attempt to stem the tide. It declared that the GDR was a separate socialist nation. The word "Germany" disappeared completely from everyday language. An exception was the central organ of the SED (Socialist Unity Party), which was still called "New Germany". Even the adjective "German" disappeared from all official names. The exceptions here were the parties and the German Democratic Republic, the name of the state. This absurdity alone demonstrated the futility of any efforts to withdraw from the German nation.

A destabilisation as a result of stabilisation occurred almost imperceptibly in the GDR. This process was inexorable precisely because it happened so slowly.

4. The Peaceful Revolution and the national question (1989)

An internal opposition was established within the sanctuary of the Church from the end of the 1970s onwards. It was a threat because it was apolitical. Incidentally, it consistently refused to use the term "opposition". The subject of peace was initially its main
concern. It liked to refer to Martin Luther King and Mahatma Ghandi as well as the Gospel. On top of this came environmental protection, child rearing, the preservation of old town centres and buildings and such like. It called neither for the abolition of the GDR nor for reunification. If any policies were formulated at all, then they tended towards a reform of socialism. From 1986 onwards they were able to call upon the policies of glasnost and perestroika, which had been proclaimed by the General Secretary of the Communist Party. This took the leadership of the SED into an intractable situation. The party leadership in the Soviet Union was the world's supreme authority for every orthodox communist and the Soviet Union was always the propaganda model for the GDR. The Soviet Union was now declaring freedom of debate, intellectual pluralism, democracy and the right of satellite states to independence.

On the other hand, the GDR had to be mindful of its public image on economic grounds, as it needed loans from the West. For both these reasons it was no longer able to use force against internal opponents, who were becoming increasingly bold in their actions without actually being a mass movement. However, the groups operating within the sanctuary of the Church were the focal point for members of the public. Wherever several people are able to meet and debate in public without fear, a tiny audience will appear and grow larger every day. It only takes one snowflake to start an avalanche that sweeps away everything in its path.

One of these snowflakes was the departure movement. When Hungary began dismantling its border fence with Austria, more and more people tried to slip through this hole in the Iron Curtain. Others climbed over the fences of embassies in Budapest and Prague. This finally brought the opposition groups out in full force. They published an appeal by the New Forum, calling for talks between the government and the people. Nothing more and nothing less. The appeal did not mention socialism or German unity. It was simply about democratic participation.

The situation remained the same over the following months. People signed this appeal all over the country. It was the first democratic mass movement since the uprising of 1953. Opposition groups were formed everywhere – nearly always in churches – under different
names, as well as a newly founded Social Democratic Party. It initially avoided talking about 
German unity as well.

The biggest demonstration of the autumn was held on 4 November 1989 in 
Alexanderplatz in East Berlin. Anyone who reads or listens to the speeches today is amazed 
at how cautious all the speakers were. The issue still seemed to be the democratisation of the 
GDR. But the night of miracles happened five days later. The Wall fell on 9 November. Tens 
of thousands of people streamed through the border crossing points without a single shot 
being fired. The way to reunification in peace and freedom was now open.
Thank you. Amb. Moon Tae Young, Dr. Lars-André Richter, thank you for hosting this wonderful joint workshop and for welcoming me here today. It is a great honor and privilege for me to stand here and speak about our paramount task, which is the unification of the Korean Peninsula. I am very pleased to share my thoughts on the task with all of you in the workshop today.

As living in the only divided country in the world, the people’s desire and will for unification is supposed to be large. Nonetheless, we have difficulties in keeping the willingness to unify the divided nation around 50%. The main cause for it is that our society could not enlighten the nation's people on this matter effectively so far for years. I cannot help but point out that the government has manipulated this issue for political purposes, instead of recognizing it as the national priority. On top of that, many experts and released reports strongly predict that reunification will be an economic bonanza. We should not solely approach unification in the matter of economical aspects. We are missing out on something more important: the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Our first order of unification is to think and understand the reasons for being unified. For the correct understanding of the subject, I shall convey myself with a few points.

Ladies and gentlemen, do you remember when most citizens used to sing ‘Our Wish is Unification’ in the 70s and 80s? Unlike that time, our nation’s willpower towards unification has weakened since the last part of the 20th century. In last year’s New Year’s
press conference, president Park Geun-hye promoted her ‘Unification Bonanza’ initiative, which seemed to have brought the national will back; however, now looking back in 2015, the effect turned out to be fairly minimal.

According to the survey conducted by Seoul National University Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, 54.8% of the people stated “unification is necessary” in 2013, and the rate went up by one percent to 55.8% in 2014. On the other hand, 21.7% of survey respondents answered that “unification is unnecessary” in 2014, which is two percent less than the result from the previous year. From this point of view, reduced negative public opinions on unification appears to reflect positive effects of ‘Unification Bonanza’. Considering this data, it seems more suitable to ask ‘How to improve willingness to unify’ than ‘How to keep the willingness’ on the given subject.

Although Korea is the only divided country in the world, we have great potential to become one of the world's strongest economic powers once unified. Many experts from other countries also agree on this idea. Although it is more important for us to understand the necessity for Korean reunification, our citizens do not perceive such matters. In order to solve these problems, we have to bear the four followings in our minds.

First, the importance of values of unification. This issue starts with the question "Why do we need to unify?", which is the key point of this presentation. So far, we have approached unification mainly on the matter of costs. As a result, one time, the fiscal costs of unification were the main concern for unification discourse. We also had the same approach towards the unification of Germany, which increased reluctant attitude towards unification costs. Thereafter, there were signs of opposition against it. People claimed that benefits from unification were greater than the costs, but that couldn't dissolve people's fears or them shying away from thoughts about unification. Young adults particularly ask, "Why do we need to unify with N. Korea, even when our lives are tough enough already?" The Unification Bonanza message from president Park is referred to a unified Korea as a way of being an economic powerhouse. Looking at it in terms of economic gains and losses will not increase social consensus or willpower of our community even though unification is a priority. I believe that when the nation understands what is really behind this, our citizens will be willing to take sacrifice.
During the War of Independence, the speech “Give me liberty, or give me death!” was delivered, and it touched the whole world. In front of the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C., the phrase “Freedom is not Free.” impresses the hearts of visitors. The number of U.S. troops who engaged in the Korean War were nearly 1.79 million in 1950. Of those, more than 40 thousand troops were killed or went missing during the war. Also, roughly a hundred thousand soldiers were wounded. For the value of liberty, young people entered the war and gave their lives for Korea. And the United States of America, their fatherland showed great deference to the patriotic, young men by inscribing “Our nation honors her sons and daughters who answered the call to defend a country they never knew and a people they never met”, on the Pool of Remembrance at the memorial.

Human beings differ from other animals in that they can lay down their lives to uphold such values. People are impressed depending on the kinds of values a country pursues and the kind of ideal nation they build up. In this sense, we should now be able to explain to the people firmly and clearly on the need for unification. In fact, the country should inform the public correctly that unification won’t be just a bonanza, but also a national task which gives freedom and offers space where North Koreans can live as human beings. Furthermore, it's inevitable that unification will bring many problems and side-effects as well. If there is no value consensus, it is hard to expect public sacrifice.

Second, restoring public confidence in unification. Our society has lost all confidence towards unification during the past 30 years. Germany marked its 25th anniversary of German reunification. While Germany – the most successful economy in Europe – has played a leading role in the European Union, we are primarily remembering negative aspects on German reunification. In other words, it's the prevalent idea that Germany was able to do so, but Korea is not likely to. As professor Ullich Blum from University of Bamberg and professor Rüdiger Frank from University of Vienna claimed, “Korea has a more favorable condition for unification than Germany did”, but we just tend not to listen to what they say. Unfortunately, the leftist media or scholars in Korea play a role in this phenomenon.

Nevertheless, many experts agree with the idea of Korean unification as a bonanza. Goldman Sachs once predicted that unified Korea would be the country that can possibly outdo Japan and Germany within 20 years. According to 2040 Korea Unification Vision
Report released by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Korea National Diplomatic Academy, unification of Korea would make the country as the 7th largest economy in the world, with a population of 80 million.

So far, major domestic research centers have variously estimated unification costs ranged from 70 trillion won to over two quadrillion won. This also means that there is no such agreed opinion since people do not understand the meaning of unification costs. In the process of German reunification, there were heated debates on unification costs. However, a conclusion came out saying that it is more rational to view the costs as an investment for the future. Estimating excessive unification costs is unfavorable for us, in terms of unification preparation. We can supply the expenses with buried natural resources in North Korea. As is well known, the underground resources are valued from seven quadrillion won to 10 quadrillion won. This is second only to our national wealth of 11 quadrillion won. We deserve to have more confidence because the underground resources can help cope with the unification costs.

In addition, it is absurd to suggest that our society has to shoulder the entire costs of unification. Famed investor Jim Rogers said, "If North and South Korea unite, I will put all my money in North Korea as an investment." There is an answer to what he said. A claim of North Korea will be recognized as one of the most attractive investment destinations that will surpass China is set to gain ground. In other words, unification costs can be made up through international investors. We need to take responsibility for improving N. Korea's legal system and constructing infrastructures such as transportation and communication. We need to work with them to attract investors around the world as well.

Unification is also a win-win game. Unity not only contributes to peace and prosperity in Eurasia, but also brings a bonanza of opportunities for all other neighboring countries. The reunification on the principles of free democracy will remove North Korea's weapons of mass destruction threats. A unified Korea will return to NPT system and lay the basis for Eurasia's peace and prosperity. On top of that, due to special benefits from N. Korea, a unified Korea will bring a great economic success in Korea and the neighboring countries, such as China, Russia, and Japan.
Third, North Koreans’ desire for national unification. From the late 1990s, when there was a famine, North Korea experienced a crisis where over two million people died of starvation. Obsessions toward nuclear weapons and missiles of Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un have brought international sanctions. Due to that fact, North Korean people's lives are being shattered and destroyed. Since the country is ruled by Kim Jong-un, his reign of terror is taking even 24 million people's last hope away. According to N. Korean defectors, most people in N. Korea nowadays are desperately hoping to get away from the vicious system by any means. We should not look away from outcry of the 24 million North Korean people, which entreats us to save them from the repressive dictatorship of Kim Jong-un.

Lastly, we need to admit the truth that "unification is not free." We hope in unification, which is a tremendous opportunity, but do not want to pay for it at the same time. For instance, while we wish for the unification, we are also being stingy with protection of North Korean defectors. This opportunistic attitude is the major impediment to the unification. It is regarded that these all mistakes will be solved when understanding the unification value correctly and restoring the unified confidence.

Once again, reunification would be a bonanza, as president Park and other experts expressed. Meanwhile, the public has weak-willed and do not know the true values of unification yet. From now on, citizens need to be confident about unification along with having non-opportunistic attitude towards being reunified with North Korea. The unification of the Korean Peninsula is not just a national affair; rather it’s your job. It is a task that we all should solve together as one. Now, it’s time to improve our willingness for unification. I would like to express my sincere thanks and appreciation to every one of you here today. “A good start is half the battle.” Just by being here with me and sharing time together to deal with the issue is an auspicious beginning, which makes me feel happy and satisfied. Thank you very much.
The Characteristics of a Development of the DMZ to a Symbol of Ecology, Prosperity and Peace

Dr. HUR Joon-Young
Korea Institute of Public Administration

I. Introduction

During the Korean War in the 1950s the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) was one of the most devastated areas where the two Koreas fought desperately against each other. Thus, the image of the DMZ has naturally stuck in the memory of all Koreans as a symbol of war, namely confrontation and conflict from the military perspective. However, this heavily militarized buffer zone between North and South Korea has inspired scholars, activists, and policy makers to suggest various alternative ideas for the land use policy of this area. It is because the DMZ contains large amount of areas untouched by humans since the end of the Korean War. This imagination transforms into various symbols under the concept of “peaceful use” of the DMZ. This concept designates the ultimate goal of the issue as a functional contribution toward the unification of the two Koreas.

Until now there has been no symbol continuously dominant for the past 60 years, and symbols like ecology, prosperity (on the economic and social-cultural field) and peace have been competing. This presentation deals with the governmental policies both on the central and local level in the DMZ area in order to find out which efforts among those mentioned above have been performed by governmental sides. This effort would be crucial to form a
corresponding symbol in that it is an official signal. Based on the review of the governmental projects, this presentation tries to find the dynamics of developing symbols. Moreover, it carefully looks into the relation between central and local governments which propose and produce these policies.

In order to achieve these goals, it is crucial to undertake an in-depth understanding of the development of policies which consolidate an image of a symbol in the corresponding field. This presentation arranges the development of the official policies at central and local levels collected by previous studies, governmental white papers and news sources into a parallel and chronological order from 1973 to 2014. The key characteristics of interactions are summarized on the basis of the analysis of dimensions such as infrastructure, ecology, prosperity (socio-cultural cooperation) and peace. In this presentation, the DMZ refers to a more widespread area; not only the DMZ itself but also the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ), in that people usually regard CCZ as a part of the DMZ due to geographical proximity and the meaning of peaceful use.

II. Development of the DMZ policies as a Symbol

1. Institutional and Infrastructural Aspects

Table 1. Utilization plans of the DMZ from institutional and infrastructural aspects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Utilization Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1970s-1980s | Institutional and Infrastructural Aspects | • South-North joint development of the DMZ proposed (1973)  
<p>|          |                 | • The 1st CCZ Development Master Plan (1979)          |
|          |                 | • A 20-clause demonstration project for the purpose of national unity, proposed (1982)* |
|          | Military Aspects | • A proposal for mutual arms reduction in the DMZ Area (1982) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Institutional and Infrastructural Aspects</th>
<th>Military Aspects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1990s  | ● The 2\textsuperscript{nd} CCZ Development 5-year Plan (1990-1994) implemented (1990)  
● Agreement on the peaceful use of the DMZ (1991)  
● The Military Facility Protection Act enforced (1993)  
● Regulations of the CCZ specified |
| 2000s  | ● The 4\textsuperscript{th} National Land Master Plan (2000-2020) implemented /MLTM (2000)  
- North-South join management for Borderland Peace Belt proposed  
● Recovering North-South transportation proposed (The 1\textsuperscript{st} North-South Korean Summit) (2000)  
● Borderland Development Support Act enforced (2001)  
● Gyeongui Railroad connected (2003)  
● The design of a pan-regional area around the border for exchange between the South-North /MOSPA (2009)  
● The 3\textsuperscript{rd} Gangwon Development Master Plan (2000-2020) implemented /GW (2000)  
- Korean Peace and Life Zone proposed  
● The 2\textsuperscript{nd} 5-Year Development Plan (2003-2007) implemented |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military Aspects</th>
<th>Support for the DMZ Ecology Tourism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law on the Regulation of the Use and Transfer of Landmine and Other Conventional Weapons enforced (2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regulations on the CCZ Amended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010s</td>
<td>The South Korea DMZ-related Policy Forum founded /MOPAS (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 「Korea DMZ Association」 formed (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An elevation of status of the ‘Border Area support act’, to a special act (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Plans for the overall development of the border area deliberated and confirmed /MOSPA (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall development plans for the DMZ area announced /GG (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Announcing plans for the establishment of the ‘Gangwon Peace Self-Governing Province’ /GW (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aspects</td>
<td>The recommencement of the psychological warfare against the North considered (2010)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Clauses related to institutional and infrastructural aspects included ① Connecting a road between Seoul and Pyeongyang and opening it, ② Complete withdrawal of military facilities in the DMZ for an easing of military tension between the two nations
** A proposal to make the DMZ a zone of peace, withdraw military personnel and equipment, disassemble military facilities, open the DMZ to the public and pursue its peaceful use etc.
*** For the DMZ, plans for a large screen, at midnight, showing Korean movies and TV entertainment programs, Korean drama and weather forecasts were proposed
1) The 1970-1980s

Utilization plans of the DMZ from institutional and infrastructural aspects were initially proposed since the 1970s, however the proposals then were only on announcement standards, and only five actual proposals were made. After the demilitarization plan of the DMZ was officially proposed from the South by the Chief delegate of the UN troops in 1971, the North also proposed the demilitarization and peacekeeping of the DMZ, but under the premise that the U.S. withdrew their troops from Korea (Eunjin Park, 2013). This was the start of the South-North discussion about the demilitarization of the DMZ in the 1970s. Later on, in 1972 the North suggested a ‘South-North joint development of the DMZ’ proposal, and in 1982 proposed a ‘20-clause demonstration project for the purpose of national unity’ with seven clauses dealing with the use of the DMZ. Also, in 1979, the North set up the general plans of the development of the DMZ through ‘The 1st CCZ Development Master plan’.

2) The 1990s

In the 1990s, a total of six institutional and military plan makings and policy proposals were made, and unlike former times, agreements were reached and actual enforcements of the proposals were shown. The Inter-Korean Basic Agreement in 1991 led to an official agreement between the South and North about the peaceful use of the DMZ. With this agreement, the South started developing many designs for the utilization of the DMZ (Eunjin Park, 2013). However the ‘Military Facility Protection Act’ enacted in 1993 modified the law for the protection of military facilities in the DMZ and the unhindered performance of military operations, therefore maintaining military tension in the area.

In the late 1990s, local governments, along with the central, started to set up policies regarding the use of the DMZ from institutional and infrastructural aspects. Located near the border, Gangwon-do and Gyeonggi-do each established a ‘Comprehensive Borderland Management Plan’ and a ‘Comprehensive Borderland Strategic Plan’, making two out of six utilization plans come from local governments. Unlike the central government, who saw the DMZ or the CCZ from only one side, local governments saw a more broad use of Korean
territory by establishing plans for the ‘Borderland’.

3) The 2000s

In the new millennium, a more macroscopic approach to the use of the DMZ began by changing the policies’ focus from the DMZ and CCZ to the ‘borderland’. First, the ‘Borderland Peace Belt’ was proposed at the 4th National Land Master Plan, and in 2001 the institutional base of the development of the ‘borderland’ was prepared through the enactment of the ‘Borderland Support Act’. And in 2003, the ‘Comprehensive Borderland Development Plan’ was established and increased hopes for the development of the ‘borderland’.

This period, unlike previous times, showed infrastructural progress, diversifying the use of institutional and infrastructural aspects. The First South-North Korean Summit in 2000 brought an agreement of an open area in the DMZ of 250m and 100m respectively for connecting the roads and railroads of the Gyeongui line and the East Sea line.

Progress in the demilitarization of the DMZ also occurred in the 2000’s. Due to the ‘Law on the Regulation of the Use and Transfer of Landmine and Other Conventional Weapons’, the use and relocation of mines and conventional weapons became limited. This event showed meaning in that it made possible a simple agreement of demilitarization made in the 1970s grow into legislation.

4) The 2010s

Endeavors to maintain the perspective of supervision and support for the ‘borderland’ and organize systems related to the utilization of the DMZ were shown in the 2010s. There was an elevation of status of the ‘Borderland Development Support Act’ to the ‘Special Act on Borderland Development Support’, and there were also measures to succeed former acts and plans such as the confirmation of the ‘Comprehensive Borderland Development Plan’. Also the establishment of a committee consisting of subjects like the ministry related to the DMZ policies, local governments and domestic and foreign experts made possible efficient
management of the DMZ through sharing information and adjusting policies.

2. The Utilization of the DMZ’s Resources and Symbols

1) Environmental and Ecological Aspects

Table 2. Utilization plans for the DMZ from environmental and ecological aspects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Utilization Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970s-1980s</td>
<td>● A 20-clause demonstration project for the purpose of national unity, proposed (1982)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1990s | ● Northeast Asia Environmental Cooperation proposed (1992)  
      ● World Wildlife Park proposed (1992)  
      ● The transformation of the DMZ into a nature park proposed (1993)  
      ● Designation of 3 borderland regions for the UNESCO Biosphere Reserve proposed /MOE (1996)  
      ● Designation of Mt. Seolak for UNESCO World Natural Heritage Site proposed (1996)  
      ● Zone of Peace and Ecology proposed (1997) |
      ● Designation of the DMZ area for UNESCO Transboundary Biosphere Reserve proposed (2001)  
        - Environmental conservation in the DMZ area and Beakudu Mountain Range  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 2006 | - Conservation of ecology in the DMZ  
       - IUCN-Korean Protected Area Forum founded (2006)  
       - Korean Government registered as a state membership of IUCN (2006)  
       - Pilot project on Han River Estuary implemented /MOE, UNDP, GEF (2007)  
       - Public-Private Joint Commission for the DMZ Area Ecosystem Conservation Measured founded /MOE (2007)  
       - Special Zone for Peace and Cooperation in Yellow Sea and DMZ Eco-Peace park proposed (The 2nd North-South Korean Summit) (2007)  
       - A joint implementation of a flood prevention program around the Imjingang River agreed (2007)  
       - DMZ Eco-Peace Park proposed (The 100 National Policy Agendas) (2008)  
       - DMZ Eco-Peace Belt proposed /MOPAS (2009)**  
       - Basic plans for a DMZ Eco-Peace Park /MOE (2009)  
       - Working-level talks for the flood prevention of the Imjingang River held (2009)  |
| 2007 | - South-North Gangwon Salmon Cooperation Project implemented /GW (2001)  
       - South-North Joint Project for Pine Needle Gall Midges in Gumgang-Seolak Region implemented /GW (2001)  
       - The 1st Chorwon Crane Festival /Cheolwon (2005)  
       - DMZ Peace-Life Valley constructed(Inje) /GW (2009)  |
| 2010s| - The designation of the DMZ as a National Park proposed /MOE (2010)  
       - Plans for designating the DMZ area as a UNESCO biosphere zone /MOE (2010)  
       - The announcement and proposal of the design of the 「DMZ World Ecological Peace Park」 at the 69th UN General Assembly’s keynote address (2014)  
       - Acceptance of the declaration for the design of the 「DMZ World Ecological Peace Park」 (2014)  
       - Obtaining research services of each area for the establishment of the overall plan |
Utilization plans of the DMZ from environmental and ecological aspects were first proposed in the 1980s through the ‘20-clause demonstration project for the purpose of national unity’. The South proposed, as part of the demonstration project, a joint academic investigation on the ecosystem in the DMZ. Attempts were made at an academic approach to the wildlife of the DMZ, but like the other proposals made in this period, it never reached the execution stage.

Many proposals regarding the DMZ from this aspect were suggested by the central government in the 1990s. Seven proposals were made out of a total of 23, making the environmental and ecological aspects make up 30.4% of the proposals about the DMZ in this period. Seeing as the central government made only six proposals about the DMZ from economic aspects, the approach from environmental and ecological aspects of the utilization plans of the DMZ had an important meaning to the central government at that time.

This can be understood as an effort to show progress of the use of the DMZ through the assistance of the international society. In a situation where policies through agreement between the South and North were difficult to realize, the interest of the environmental and ecological use of the international society had a huge influence on searching for the use of the

* Clauses related to environmental and ecological aspects included a proposal of a joint academic investigation on the ecosystem and the plants and animals in the DMZ
** Zone for Biodiversity Conservation and Geo-Park, UN and Int’l Organizations, South-North Cooperation and Exchange Zone, Peace Village
DMZ. The proposal by the UNEP and IUCN of constructing an international nature park in the DMZ, and the proposal by former president Young-sam Kim of transforming the DMZ into a nature park were such movements (Eunjin Park, 2013).

The approach from environmental and ecological aspects still made up a considerable amount of the utilization of the DMZ in the 2000’s, and it was led by the central government than local governments. Of a total of 59 proposals, 20 proposals were environmental and ecological based, making up 33.9% of the proposals. 16 of these were proposed by the central government, making them the leading subject in this area. However, local governments, fulfilling all four projects they proposed, showed better results than the central government, completing only 11 out of their total of 16.

The environmental and ecological approach diminished in the 2010’s, and the tendency of the central government leading the proposals also decreased. Of a total of 40 proposals, only 10 were based on an environmental and ecological approach, showing a decrease of 8.9% compared to the previous period. Also the central government proposed only 40% of the total, showing an alteration in its leading role. Local governments, however, showed a decrease in its proposal completions, having every proposal stop at its planning stage.

2) Economic, social and cultural aspects

Table 3. Utilization plans of the DMZ from economic, social and cultural aspects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Utilization Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970s-1980s</td>
<td>Economic aspects</td>
<td>● A 20-clause demonstration project for the purpose of national unity, proposed (1982)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social and Cultural</td>
<td>● A 20-clause demonstration project for the purpose of national unity, proposed (1982)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Economic aspects</td>
<td>Social and Cultural aspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South-North Joint Industry zone, Student Community Center proposed (1991)</td>
<td>Soccer Stadium for Peace and Unification in the DMZ proposed /GG (1996)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deregulation for Tourism Sites in the DMZ area enforced (1994)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South-North Special Administrative Zone for Economy, Tourism, and Exchange proposed (1998)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tourism for Mt. Gumgang started (1998)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>South-North Cooperation Projects implemented (2001)****</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Projects for Gaeseong Industrial Complex implemented (2003)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DMZ Peace and Life Zone, Trekking Course proposed /MCST, KTO, GW (2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A wide tourism development of the Peace-Life Area planned/MCST (2009)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South-North Technical Cooperation for Native Seed Potato Project implemented /GW (2001)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The 4th Development Plan for Tourism in Gangwon /GW (2006)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Threes model sites for the DMZ Peace and Life Belt designated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Social and Cultural aspects** | ● The 4th Gyeonggi Development Plan for Regional Tourism /GG (2007)  
- Peace tourism for cultural and historical asses in the DMZ area proposed  
● Project for the Special Tourism Region for the Peace and Life Zone implemented /GG (2008)  
● Gangwon DMZ Tourism Office opened /GW (2008) |

| **2010s** | ● The 1st Trout Festival /Hwacheon (2003)  
● The 1st Chorwon DMZ International Peace Marathon /Cheolwon (2004)  
● The 1st DMZ Half Marathon /Yanggu (2004)  
● The 1st DMZ Peace Prize Ceremony /GW (2005)  
● The 1st World Peace Festival /GG (2005)  
● Partnership with HSS signed /GW (2006)  
● The 1st DMZ Unification Marathon /Goseung, Gangwon-ilbo News Agency (2006)  
● Korea DMZ Peace Life Valley Education and Training Center opened /Inje (2009)  
● The 1st DMZ Korean International Documentary Festival /GG (2009)  
● DMZ Museum opened /Goseung (2009) |

| **Economic aspects** | ● Construction of a DMZ trekking trail designed /KFS (2011)  
● An ecological Tourism Belt around the DMZ area designed (2011)  
● Plans for the next ‘Gaesong Industrial Complex’ on the DMZ designed (2013)  
● Green Tourism related to the DMZ and commercialized ecological experience developed /GW (2010)  
● The development of a ‘peace industrial area’ designed /Cheolwon (2012) |
### Social and Cultural aspects

- Plans for hosting the DMZ world mountain bike competition /MOPAS (2010)
- Pushing ahead plans for the construction of the 「South-North Youth Center for Interaction」 (2010)
- Held the 「UniKorea Global Leadership Camp」 at the DMZ Peace-Life Valley (2011)

### Economic, Social and Cultural aspects

- The development of a tourist area around the Imjingak Pyeonghoa-Nuri designed /GG (2012)
- Plans for constructing a Tourism Belt around North Gyeonggi-do /GG (2013)
- Plans for hosting the Imjingak-Kaesong marathon /GG (2012)
- Plans for the South-North to co-host the ‘Big Painting Contest’ at the Pyeonghoa-Nuri Park/GG (2013)
- Hosting the DMZ World Peace Concert /GG (2013)
- Hosting the Pyeonghoa-Nuri Road Bicycle Tour /GG (2013)
- Publishing a full-detailed guidebook on the DMZ /GG (2014)

* Clauses related to economic, social and cultural aspects, four in total, included contents such as ① Mt. Seorak and Mt. Geumgang being opened to the public as a joint area of free traveling, ② Unrestricted travel of foreigners through the Panmunjeom, ③ A South-North free fishing area set up, ④ Construction of a joint stadium in the DMZ

** Clauses related to economic, social and cultural aspects included the setting up of a family reunion center, a national culture center, a goods trade center etc.

*** The DMZ Peace Tourism, Unification Tourism Belt

**** DMZ Peace Tourism, Mt. Gumgang-Seolak Tourism Belt

Along with the environmental and ecological aspects of the utilization of the DMZ, the idea of using the DMZ from economic, social and cultural aspects were first suggested through the ‘20-clause demonstration project for the purpose of national unity’ in 1982. Of the seven demonstration projects regarding the DMZ, four were focused on the use of the
DMZ from economic, social and cultural aspects. In specific, two proposals were about tourism and fishing from economic aspects, and the other two, from social and cultural aspects, were about unrestricted travel of foreigners and the construction of a joint stadium. As any other proposal made in this era, no proposal from these aspects reached the level of initiation.

Various proposals of utilizing the DMZ from economic aspects were made in contrast to the few made from social and cultural aspects in the 1990s. 10 proposals out of 23 were made from the economic, social and cultural aspects, making up 43.5% of the total. But out of the 10 proposals, seven were from economic aspects, showing initiative compared to the social and cultural aspects. Furthermore, the focus on the economic aspects was shown by the central government, with only one proposal made from social and cultural aspects.

Vigorous suggestions were made about the utilization of the DMZ from economic, social and cultural aspects in the 2000s, but most were led by local governments. 21 out of 59 utilization plans were from economic, social and cultural aspects, composing up to 35.6% of the total, but only six were proposed by the central government. In contrast, the remaining 15 were all suggested by local governments, making them the leaders in the use of the DMZ from economic, social and cultural aspects. The central government, compared to the previous era, suggested only 50% of the proposals from economic aspects, showing decreases in the role of economic aspects as well as social and cultural aspects.

The utilization of the DMZ from economic, social and cultural aspects in the 2010s showed similar features to the previous era in its percentage of the total and the dominance of local governments. 14 out of 38 proposals made the economic, social and cultural approach comprise 36.8% of the total. Also, 57% of economic aspects and 71.4% of social and cultural aspects were made by local governments, showing their consistent leading role.
3) Peaceful aspects

Table 4. Utilization plans of the DMZ from peaceful aspects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Utilization Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970s-1980s</td>
<td>• A proposal for a peace city (1988)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>• An announcement by the North of a 10-clause disarmament bill (1990)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Zone of Peace and Ecology proposed (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• South-North Unification City proposed/ MOU (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>• Special Zone for Peace and Cooperation in Yellow Sea and DMZ Eco-Peace park proposed (The 2nd North-South Korean Summit) (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• DMZ Eco-Peace Park proposed (The 100 National Policy Agendas) (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• DMZ Peace and Life Zone, Trekking Course proposed /MCST, KTO, GW (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• DMZ Eco-Peace Belt proposed /MOPAS (2009)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Basic plans for an Eco-Peace Park around the DMZ area /MOE (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Korean Peace and Life Zone proposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Imjingak Pyeonghoa-nuri Park opened /GG (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Korea DMZ Peace Forum founded /GW (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Peace Zone Projects proposed /GW (2008)****</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Dorasan Peace Park opened /GG (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• DMZ Peace-Life Valley constructed(Inje) /GW (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• World Peace Bell Park opened /Hwacheon (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010s</td>
<td>• Designs for the peaceful use of the DMZ area /MOU (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The construction of the ‘Pyeonghoa-Nuri Cycling Road’ planned /MOPAS(2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Hosting the 「Peaceful Unity National Conference」 at the Imjingak Pavilion (2011)
- Announcing and proposing the idea of the 「DMZ World Peace Park」 through a joint speech by the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives (2013)
- The announcement and proposal of the design of the 「DMZ World Ecological Peace Park」 at the 69th UN General Assembly’s keynote address (2014)
- Acceptance of the declaration for the design of the 「DMZ World Ecological Peace Park」 (2014)
- Obtaining research services of all areas for the establishment of the overall plan of the 「DMZ World Ecological Peace Park」 (2014)
- The opening of the 「Center for Unified Future of Korea」 (2014)*****
- The construction of a ‘Peace Culture Square’(Cheorwon) /GW (2014)
- Planning for the Imjingang River to be designated as a ‘peaceful, cultural area’ /GG (2012)
- Hosting the DMZ World Peace Concert /GG (2013)

* A proposal for the setting up of a family reunion center, a national culture center, a goods trade center etc.
** A proposal to make the DMZ a zone of peace, withdraw military personnel and equipment, disassemble military facilities, open the DMZ to the public and pursue its peaceful use etc.
*** Zone for Biodiversity Conservation and Geo-Park, UN and Int’l Organizations, South-North Cooperation and Exchange Zone, Peace Village
**** Peace City, UN University, Special Tourism and Industrial Development Projects
***** Change of name from the 「South-North Youth Center for Interaction」
In relation to peaceful aspects of utilization of the DMZ, attempts were made at constructing a ‘Peace City’ in the DMZ in the 1980s. The establishment of a family reunion center, a national culture center and a goods trade center were some of the details. They were composed of plans from many aspects, and showed no difference to the other proposals made in this era in that it went no further than its early stages. However, this plan showed difference by using ‘peace’ as a symbol for the first time in a proposal related to the utilization of the DMZ.

The 1990s showed a lack of proposals from peaceful aspects, but the South and North confirmed that their basic conceptions about the peaceful use of the DMZ were alike. Three out of 23 proposals were made from peaceful aspects, comprising only 13% of the total. However, the most remarkable point was that the South was not alone in suggestions regarding the utilization of the DMZ. The North also made some suggestions through the disarmament bill announced in 1990, which included proposals regarding making the DMZ a zone of peace and opening the DMZ to the public and securing its peaceful use.

Plans for use of the DMZ from peaceful aspects greatly increased in the 2000s. 15 proposals were made, making up 25.4% of the total. This was an increase by 12 proposals from the previous era, showing an increase by 95.4% of its composition of the total. The wide use of ‘peace’ as a symbol for plans regarding the DMZ started from this period, and this approach especially grew in numbers after the ‘2nd North-South Korean Summit’ in 2007.

In the 2000s, the central government proposed plans of utilizing the DMZ from a combination of environmental, ecological and peaceful aspects, and local governments first started to suggest ways of using the DMZ from peaceful aspects. The central government suggested seven utilization methods, and five of them were suggestions from environmental and ecological aspects. However suggestions by local governments did not show this tendency. Eight proposals from peaceful aspects were made by local governments in this period, and six of them were realized through establishment of specific plans or construction of parks.
The central government continued to propose utilization plans from the combined aspect from the 2000s, and local governments kept on with their proposals from peaceful aspects in the 2010s. Especially, the planning of constructing the 「DMZ Ecological Peace Park」 led to this project leading the talks in the utilization of the DMZ in a peaceful way. As seen from the name of the park, the central government continues to connect the peaceful use of the DMZ with environmental and ecological aspects. Local governments, on the other hand, suggested four proposals of the utilization of the DMZ where ‘peace’ is used as an independent symbol.

III. Analysis of the DMZ Policies

1. Change of Subject Throughout Each Period

Talks about the utilization of the DMZ were initially started by the central government, and participation from local governments did not start until the late 1990s. The dominant role of the central government in proposals regarding the use of the DMZ was possible in the 1970s and 1980s because of restrictions regarding proposals suggested by local governments (Miura, 2011). The suspension of local elections ended up hindering the governments’ proposals. Later on in 1995, the establishment of local governments elected by popular vote brought political interest to the development of the border area (Eunjin Park, 2013). The subject of proposals regarding the utilization of the DMZ was heavily influenced by the political situation of the South, namely the settlement of the local autonomy system.

Utilization proposals made by local governments were mainly on realizable standards, focusing on a certain aspect or area, compared to the more comprehensive ideas suggested by the central government. The central government set up the ‘1st CCZ Development Plan’ in the 1980s, constructing the institutional base of further proposals. Basic plans for the use of the DMZ and macroscopic proposals were continuously led by the central government, from institutional, environmental, ecological, economic and peaceful aspects. Suggestions for the
use of the DMZ by governments of Gangwon-do and Gyeonggi-do, in contrast, were intended for a single purpose. Hosting of a marathon and festival and opening a museum and park in the DMZ in 2000 were such examples of proposals put into execution.

The main subject of talks from environmental and ecological aspects was the central government, whereas local governments showed initiative in the use of the DMZ from social and cultural aspects. The central government consistently showed effort to catch the international society’s attention to activate the use of the DMZ. These reasons led to the control of the central government of approaches from environmental and ecological aspects. That is, with the support of organizations such as the UNEP and IUCN, who showed great interest in the ecosystem of the DMZ, the central government eagerly proposed utilization plans from those aspects. This tendency also could be found in the construction of the 「DMZ World Ecological Peace Park」. The construction, announced at the UN General Assembly’s keynote address and mentioned in a joint speech by the U.S. Senate and the House of Representatives, is targeting the approval of the international society. On the other hand, the central government showed little interest in the use of the DMZ from social and cultural aspects, making local governments be the leading role in the talks. This can be seen in the early 1990s, where only two proposals for the use of the DMZ were made from social and cultural aspects.

Table 5. Utilization plans of the DMZ proposed by the central and local government for each period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Environmental and ecological aspects</th>
<th>Economic aspects</th>
<th>Social and cultural aspects</th>
<th>Peaceful Aspects</th>
<th>Total*</th>
<th>Total number of proposals **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s-1980s</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(건)
2. Change of Aspects Throughout Each Period

Utilization plans of the DMZ in the 1970s and 1980s were focused on the peaceful use of the DMZ; that is, the proposals made in this era were for demilitarization. Unlike the 1960s, when the DMZ was treated as a fortress due to the attack on the Blue House by North special forces, the easing of tension of the Cold War in the 1970s triggered talks between the South and North about the demilitarization of the DMZ (Eunjin Park, 2013). After Major General Rogers, Chief Representative of the UN forces, officially proposed a four-clause demilitarization plan of the DMZ on June 6th 1971, the North proposed to demilitarize and keep the peace of the DMZ under the condition that the U.S troops in the South would retreat back to their homeland (Eunjin Park, 2013). This easing of tension led to a bundle of policies and business regarding the DMZ. The proposal of the ‘20-clause demonstration project for the purpose of national unity’ and the ‘Proposal for a Peace City’ are some of its examples. These proposals, including details for the demilitarization of the DMZ, can be interpreted as an extension of the efforts for demilitarization.

The 1990s and 2000s showed many proposals from environmental, ecological and economic aspects. Seven proposals each were made in the 1990s from environmental and ecological and economic aspects, composing over 50% of the total amount of utilization plans suggested in this period. The 2000s showed similar tendencies, with 30 proposals made altogether from these aspects, again making up more than half of the total. The focus of the talks regarding the DMZ had changed from demilitarization to a more environmental,
ecological and economic aspect. Especially, the start of the Mt. Geumgang tours in 1998 showed an impressive result for economic aspects of the DMZ’s use. The tours developed into the designation of a special economic zone around the Mt. Geumgang area, and continued until a tourist was shot to death at Mt. Geumgang in 2008. These events had meaning in that they were results of cooperation between the South and North, and not a one-sided decision.

Use of the DMZ from social and cultural aspects did not appear even throughout the 1990s and were activated in the 2000s by local governments. Utilization from these aspects were a part of policies made in the 1980s, but no further proposals were made until 1995. Only three proposals were made in the late 1990s, and of them only one, the ‘1st DMZ Art Festival’ was executed. This all changed with the new millennium, with ten proposals all made by local governments. Also the local governments did not stop at an early stage; all ten proposals were realized, contributing greatly to the DMZ’s social and cultural projects.

Also, the use of the DMZ from peaceful aspects was eagerly proposed in the 2000s. There had been former proposals related to this aspect, namely the demilitarization talks in the 1970s and 1980s. But after the announcement of a 10-clause disarmament bill by the North in 1990, suggestions for the peaceful use of the DMZ vanished. Proposals from peaceful aspects were made, one each in 1997 and 1998, but they never reached execution. Attempts at using the DMZ as a region of peace grew again in the late 2000s through the ‘2nd North-South Korean Summit’. The proposal for a ‘Special Zone for Peace and Cooperation in Yellow Sea and DMZ Eco-Peace Park’ marked a start of proposals from a combination of environmental and ecological aspects and ‘peace’ as a symbol. This continued to the planning of the construction of the 「DMZ Eco-Peace Park」. The flaw in this, however, was that the proposals from the combined aspects are still at a proposal level, currently showing little sign of realization. Local governments, on the other hand, emphasized only the peaceful aspects and have had success with constructing parks, showing more progress.

3. Change of Features Throughout Each Period
One symbolic proposal including various details regarding the use of the DMZ was the ideal form of proposals in the 1980s, but this changed in the 1990s to many proposals each with a single purpose, suggested by various subjects. The ‘20-clause demonstration project for the purpose of national unity’ in the 1980s included seven clauses regarding the DMZ, and in the ‘Proposal for a peace city’ in the 1990s included proposals such as the establishment of a family reunion center, and a national culture center. Thus, the features of the utilization plans of the DMZ in this period was a ‘policy package’. However this changed after the 1990s, into various proposals suggested by subjects such as the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, the Ministry of Environment, the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, Gyeonggi-do and Gangwon-do.

Both the South and North showed contradicting approaches to institutional and infrastructural and military aspects. Some military proposals regarding the DMZ focus on demilitarization, like the ‘Proposal for mutual arms reduction in the DMZ area’ in the 1980s and the disarmament bill in the 1990, where others like the ‘Military Facility Protection Act’ focus on the protection of military facilities in the DMZ. Therefore some military measures related to the DMZ opposed the proposals made from institutional and infrastructural aspects. As seen from considering the recommencement of psychological warfare against the North after the attack on the Cheonan in 2010, the DMZ acts as a strategic point when South-North relations hit hard times. This tendency is also being seen nowadays with the loudspeaker messages by the South, due to the recent mine explosion accident.

IV. Concluding Remark

What is notable about the policies made for the peaceful utilization of the DMZ is the increase of participants in the ‘DMZ Symbol Governance’, leading to the consolidation and expansion of symbols. The central government initially composed most of the participants of the governance, but an increase of participation of local governments were shown in the late 1990s, and with that the central government spread its authorities to ministries such as the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Public Administration and Security, the Ministry of
Environment and the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism. Also recent policies, focused on receiving approval from the international society, have made considerable progress. This is provided foundation for the consolidation of a symbol through DMZ related policies. Thus, division of the area of focus, such as detailed plans from local governments about the central government’s comprehensive ideas and the local governments focusing on social and cultural problems compared to the central government focusing on environmental and ecological issues, was found in certain areas, but as time passed the symbols eventually showed equal progress. The change of the number of proposals, from four in the 1970s and 1980s to 23 in the 1990s, 58 in the 2000s and 40 in the 2010s, where only half the decade has passed, show this tendency. This change from passiveness to activeness from the participation of the ‘DMZ Symbol Governance’ made not one, unrivaled symbol receive all the attention; in fact, a combination of various symbols, as seen in the Ecological Peace Park; a combination of the ecosystem, prosperity and peace, is promoting synergy, showing positive signs on the improvement of South-North relations. However, these signs can only be confirmed with efforts from the North also, therefore the participation and approval of the North will be the key. The design, and successful execution of a ‘green detent’ through the DMZ policies and participation of the private sector is highly desired.
<References>


Eunjin Park, “Probability and direction of the 「DMZ World Ecological Peace Park」”

Citizens Coalition for Economic Justice Korea Reunification Society: Multiple Debates for Problems and Solutions of the South-North Economic Cooperation, 2013 (in Korean)
SESSION II
Cooperation for Trust-Building
(14:00-17:00)

Moderator:
Dr. SON Gi-Woong
Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification

Presentations:

“Further Special Administrative Industrial Regions, Kaesong as a Role Model”
Dr. YANG Chang-Seok
Auditor, Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation

“DMZ World Eco-Peace Park and Transboundary Conservation as a Start of Cooperation, Peace and Exchange”
Dr. PARK Eun-Jin
Head of Future Planning, National Institute of Ecology

“OSCE in Northeast Asia”
Dr. Dorjraa MUNKHTUR
Chief, Institute for Strategic Studies, Mongolia
Further Special Administrative Industrial Regions, Kaesong as a Role Model

Dr. YANG Chang-Seok
Auditor, Gaeseong Industrial District Foundation

1. Introduction

The liberal administrations under former ROK Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun engaged deeply with the North Koreans and in particular, boasted about having made the great contribution to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula made by the three major inter-Korean joint projects; the Mount Geumgang tourism, the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) and the linking of cross-border roads and railways.

The Mount Geumgang tourism project started in November 1998 when President Kim was struggling to resolve the financial crisis inherited from his predecessor Kim Young Sam. Shortly after President Kim Dae Jung had the summit meeting in June 2000 with Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defense Commission of North Korea, Chung Joo Young, chairman of the Hyundai Group visited North Korea. He met Kim Jong Il and agreed to start a joint economic project in Kaesong, the capital city of the Koryo Dynasty. Kaesong was also one of North Korean army’s main invasion routes into South Korea during the Korean War, and, ironically, the venue for negotiations for the Armistice agreement to end the war.

---

1 On May 3, 2000, Hyundai and Asia-Pacific Peace Committee of North Korea concluded a provisional agreement on seven economic cooperation projects, including an industrial park in Kaesong, and on August 22, 2000 signed an Agreement on South-North Economic Cooperation Project.
Ground was broken to construct the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) on June 30, 2003. Roads and railways were linked across the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in the East and the West of the peninsula to facilitate the industrial park and tourism.

Unfortunately, however, the Mount Geumgang tourism came to a halt because a tourist, who had strayed into an off-limits area, was shot and killed by the North Korean army in July 2008. To that point, a total of 1.93 million South Korean people had visited the beautiful resort. The tours failed to resume since that time largely due to differences between North and South Korea over how to guarantee security for the South Korean tourists.

After the killing incident, North Korea raised tension on the Korean peninsula by stopping Kaesong tourism and the operation of freight trains across the DMZ from December 2008. North Korea also closed unilaterally the South-North Office for Economic Cooperation based in the KIC. While stressing that it would “exceptionally” allow business activities at the KIC, North Korea limited the number of persons and vehicles to and from the industrial park.

The KIC survived the May 24, 2010 sanctions which were imposed against North Korea by the South Korean government in retaliation for the sinking of a South Korean naval corvette, Cheonan. All inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation including trade were banned except for the KIC and humanitarian assistance for vulnerable segments of the North Korean population.

Therefore, currently the KIC remains the only active inter-Korean joint project. Everyday an average of around 400 people and 350 vehicles travel to and from the KIC. 124 South Korean business firms are producing goods there with 800 South Korean and 54,000 North Korean workers. The KIC is the venue for North and South Korean people to renew national identity and hope for reunification. In addition, the KIC is a ‘place of hope’ for South Korean small and medium sized businesses, which have lost competitiveness in South Korea and foreign countries due to huge costs of manpower and land.
In this paper, I intend to examine the background for inter-Korean joint projects and the value of the KIC in terms of inter-Korean relations and future unification. Challenges and future prospects for the KIC and other inter-Korean joint projects will also be analyzed.

2. Background for Inter-Korean Joint Projects

Inter-Korean cooperation projects were initiated by business circles and facilitated by warming inter-Korean relations. North and South Korean authorities held meetings and agreed on many practical issues related to the project, including travel, telecommunications and safety guarantee. The Mount Geumgang tourism and the KIC projects were developed by a business tycoon, Chung Ju Yung, who was born in North Korea and migrated to the South in his early teens. He had a deep personal interest in developing his hometown as a tourist resort. His love for his hometown was demonstrated by his visit to North Korea in June, 1998 with 500 heads of cattle, which he brought as a gift to the North Korean people. He believed that such economic projects would contribute to an ultimate unification of Korea.

Chung’s ambitious inter-Korean projects, however, would not have been possible without favorable inter-Korean relations and support from the South Korean government. He first visited North Korea in January 1989 and signed a memorandum with North Korea to develop Mount Geumgang. But he had to wait until the cold front in Korea was cleared with the US-North Korea nuclear deal in 1994 and subsequent ground breaking for building light-water reactors (LWR) in North Korea in August 1997. In particular, a liberal government under Kim Dae Jung was inaugurated in February 1998 and started engaging North Korea through the so-called “sunshine policy.” The first inter-Korea summit meeting of June 2000 created a momentum for expanded inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. Chairman Chung met Kim Jong Il at the end of June, following the inter-Korean summit, and an agreement to develop an industrial park in Kaesong was concluded in August 2000.

North Korea also had a deep interest in opening its territory to joint venture projects with South Korea and the international community. In the 1990s, North Korea faced serious economic crisis due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in East
Europe, and natural disasters in 1995-1997. With the loss of export markets and the end of friendship prices for imported Chinese goods, including oil and grain, North Korea suffered from a hard currency shortage. Kim Jong Il expressed his interest in gaining hard currency from the KIC during his meeting with Chung Ju Yung in June 2000. In addition to agreement to develop special economic zones in Mount Geumgang and Kaesong, North Korea designated Shinuiju, a city on the border with China as a special administrative zone in September 2002. In July 2002, North Korea started a modest economic reform effort by introducing market elements in price and wage systems, and in the management of farms and enterprises.

3. KEDO as a model for joint venture with outside world

North Korea started institutional preparations for establishing joint ventures with the outside world by enacting the Joint Venture Law in 1984 and opened Rajin and Sonbong city as a free economy and trade zone in 1991. But it failed to attract substantial foreign direct investment, with the exception of a casino hotel, due to poor infrastructure and its rigid socialist economic system.

Faced with economic and diplomatic difficulties in the early 1990s, particularly after South Korea normalized relations with its allies, Soviet Union and China, North Korea sought to improve relations with the United States, a unipolar world power in the post-cold war era. After concluding a historic agreement on reconciliation, non-aggression and exchanges and cooperation with South Korea in December 1991, North Korea started high-level talks with the US from January 1992. The US and North Korea later concluded an agreement, the Agreed Framework in October 1994, under which it would freeze its fissile production facilities at its nuclear center at Yongbyon, and, in return, the US would provide

---

3 This section copies parts of the author’s previous paper titled “The KEDO LWR Project; Locomotive for Peace and Reconciliation in Korea,” The Political Economy of Korean Reconciliation and Reform (KEI; Washington D.C., 2001), pp. 30-33.
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was founded in March 1995 as a public international organization to coordinate cooperation among interested parties and to facilitate the financing and execution of the projects needed to implement the Agreed Framework. KEDO was an international consortium consisting of representatives from the US, South Korea, Japan and EU. The project to construct two units of LWR proceeded on the basis of the Supply Agreement of December 1995 and eight implementation protocols signed between KEDO and North Korea. Although North Korea was initially opposed to South Korea’s playing a key role in the LWR project, it finally agreed during the high-level talks in May-June 1995 to the US proposal that ‘KEDO shall select the reactor model and a prime contractor to carry out the LWR project.’ North Korea was informed that KEDO had already specified in its Charter of March 1995 of “the Korean standard nuclear plant model” and would designate the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) as a prime contractor for the LWR project.

North Korea, known as a hermit kingdom, seemed to be concerned about possible negative impact of the LWR project on its security. Let me give five examples. First, the North Korean authorities made all-out efforts to insulate its people from the first-ever joint venture with “capitalistic imperialists.” North Korea designated Kumho, a small coastal village as a special district, and built barbed wire fences around the construction site there. It went so far as to not allow KEDO staff and South Korean workers to travel in the daytime until the middle of 1998.

Second, North Korea did not accept KEDO’s proposal to transport its staff and workers to the Kumho site by sea until the end of 2000. North Korean officials told their KEDO counterparts that their security related agencies including the People’s Army were concerned about any infiltration attempt by outside forces by the sea routes. From 2001, North Korea agreed that 50 passengers could visit the site by boarding KEDO’s cargo-passage ship which ran on a barge route between Sokcho, a South Korean port and Shinpo,
a North Korean port near Kumho. The number of passengers was gradually increased up to 100.

Third, the North Korean authorities were very rigid in enforcing the agreement that KEDO staff and workers shall not carry banned items in and out of North Korea. North Korean customs officials searched through all baggage and personal bags to find banned items, including South Korean newspaper and other printed materials and porn CDs. North Korean security officials were very concerned that KEDO workers might contact and hand over gifts to North Korean villagers.

Fourth, the North Koreans did not allow KEDO to install an independent satellite communications network, though they had agreed to do that, 24 months after the ground breaking for the LWR. At the experts meeting for the satellite communications networks in May 2002, the head of the North Korean delegation stated security-related agencies were strongly opposed to the independent communications system. By October 2002, however, when KEDO and North Korea held the same experts meetings, North Korea had allowed a UN agency and the British Embassy to install an independent satellite communications networks.

Fifth, from the beginning, North Korea stuck to its dogma that the nuclear issues should be addressed between the US and North Korea, and tried hard to exclude South Korean roles in the LWR project. As mentioned above, it was strongly against the US-ROK decision regarding the Korean standard reactor model and a South Korean prime contractor. In addition, North Korea did not recognize presence of South Korean delegate during KEDO-North Korea meetings. Although the South Korean deputy Executive Director asked questions, North Koreans directed answers to the American head of delegation. They had in mind that the US served as the principal point of contact for the project. As the project went on, however, such attitudes against South Korea changed to such an extent that the North Korean officials received the South Korean deputy Executive Director warmly during his visit in 2001 and two North Korean delegations visited South Korea in December 2001 and May 2002 respectively.
Through the LWR project, the North Korean leadership gradually became confident that they could manage to minimize the impact of the LWR project on their people. They probably came to realize they could enter into profitable joint ventures with the outside world without much concern about possible harm to internal stability by setting “mosquito nets.”

The Mount Geumgang Tourism and the KIC are good examples of North Korea’s compromising security interest to gain economic benefits. There were many similarities between the KEDO and inter-Korean joint projects: barbed wire fences, no personal contacts with North Koreans, tight inspections at North Korean CIQ (Customs, Immigration & Quarantine), and no admission of cellular phones into the North Korean territory. It seems to me that KEDO project laid the groundwork for these inter-Korean cooperation projects.

4. Significance of the Kaesong Industrial Complex

First, the KIC project is a “business for peace” model project jointly facilitated by the two Koreas and the US. Located just one-hour ride away from Seoul, the Kaesong district is strategically very important for North Korea. The road running through Kaesong was a main route for the North Korean invasion in June 1950. Kim Jong Il persuaded his military leaders to pull back military units and artillery forces from the strategically critical area. During working-level meetings regarding the KIC in June 2009, North Korean officials demanded a radical increase of lease price, land-use charges and wages, because “they should take into account special political, economic and military nature of the KIC.” In addition, North Korea agreed to open a corridor of 100,000 square meters across the DMZ for people and vehicles to enter the KIC. This marks a significant departure in its security policy from its restriction of the number of KEDO passengers via the barge route.

---

4 Business for Peace (B4P) was launched in September 2013 by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. The UN Global Compact has built on “B4P” platform to promote responsible business in high-risk and conflict affected areas. Three enterprises at the KIC have joined in the “B4P” in 2014.

5 North and South Korea agreed to link roads and railways across the border in the Western part of the Korean peninsula during the Minister-level talks in July and August, 2000.
Naval skirmishes broke out in 1999 and 2002 between the two Koreas near the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea. The South Korean government aimed at reducing tension and promoting peace on the Korean peninsula by transforming the former battle field into a peace zone in Kaesong. A senior South Korean official referred to the peace initiative in 1950 by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman for a joint management and production of coal and steel, vital resources for producing tanks and guns. Schuman’s proposal was intended to integrate Germany, a former enemy into the process of peace and common prosperity. His initiative gave birth to the European Coal and Steel Community, which has developed into the European Union.

At the beginning, the Bush administration did not want South Korea to speed up inter-Korean exchange and cooperation while the nuclear issue remained unresolved. But after close consultations with the South Korean government, including minister-level meetings, the US administration decided to render its support for the development of the KIC. A key obstacle to developing an industrial park in North Korea was the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) which the US government applied to exports of products containing American technology or software to enemy states like North Korea. South Korean firms needed to build factories and offices with computers, machines and other high-technology. Many items were subject to the EAR, and South Korean enterprises were required to obtain prior licenses to export such items to Kaesong. US government agencies, including Departments of State and Commerce were very cooperative and speedy in licensing a long list of more than 1,000 items to be sent to Kaesong for running 15 factories at the pilot site.

South Korean governments discussed the EAR issue intensively with the related US departments, including the Commerce Department. In August 2004, the Minister of Unification went to Washington to have meetings with Vice President, Defense Secretary, 

---

6 Minister of Chung Dong Young’s remarks during his luncheon meeting with the Diplomatic Corps based in Seoul, November 28, 2005.

7 Joint Statement issued after a summit meeting at the White House between President Bush and President Roh Moo Hyen on May 14, 2003 states “future inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation will be conducted in light of developments on the North Korean nuclear issue.
and Secretary of State. Minister Chung stressed to them that the KIC would contribute to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. A task force team to manage the KIC was formed and visited Washington to discuss the EAR issue with American officials in September 2004. Without US support, the KIC could not have started its operation in 2004 and could not develop as it is today.

Second, the KIC is a leading joint venture for mutual prosperity for North and South Korea. The KIC is a model of a comparative advantage by which South Korea provides technology and capital, while North Korea supplies land and labor. The KIC has offered new chance for its small-and-medium (SME) enterprises with cheap land and labor. About 6,000 South Korean firms have benefited from the KIC by providing raw materials, food stuffs and daily necessities. On the other hand, North Korea has benefited from the KIC in several respects: (a) North Korean workers were trained by South Korean companies, although some North Korean workers already had skills training before joining the KIC. According to South Korean managers, North Korean workers learn skills in a relatively short time: whereas it takes around 6 months for Southeast Asian workers to learn a certain skill, it only takes 2 to 3 months for North Korean workers. Labor productivity of the KIC was estimated to be better that that in China and Vietnam. (b) They have learned about the market system and principles, including the meaning and significance of profit, claim, quality control, incentives, meeting deadlines and etc. (c) The North Korean government has earned badly-needed hard currency from the wages for its workers. Neighboring cities and towns also benefit from the KIC by supplying food materials and snacks. (d) The related North Korean agencies learned about the legal and institutional framework and procedures for developing special economic districts. In fact, they copied the KIC regulations for the Rason Special Economic Zone and Hwanggeumpyong Special Economic District. (e) North Korean workers and their families enjoy a better life thanks to the KIC, with their increased purchasing power, special supplies including snacks, and better working environment including showers and electric battery chargers. In particular, 200,000 citizens of Kaesong are supplied everyday with 15,000 tons of high-quality purified drinking water by the KIC authorities.

8 Chung Dong Young & Ji Seung Ho, *Unification in 10 Years* (Seoul: Salimteo, 2013), pp. 90-100.
Third, the KIC will serve as a model for other special economic development zones and, in the longer-term perspective, will contribute to building an economic community. As mentioned above, the KIC has provided legal and institutional frameworks for North Korean joint ventures with foreign countries. North and South Korea agreed in the October 4, 2007 declaration to construct special economic zone or cooperative complex in Haeju, Anbyun and Nampo of North Korea. Inter-Korean joint ventures in these areas would promote peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, and bring economic benefits to the two Koreas.

North Korea has recently designated 19 areas as Economic Development Districts (13 in November 2013, 6 in July 2014) which will be developed by regional governments. In addition to an unfavorable political environment, there are many difficulties for local governments in attracting foreign capitals and technology, including poor infrastructure and lack of knowledge about the market economy. But North Koreans can learn valuable lessons from the KIC experiences. When inter-Korean relations return to normal, South Korean business community could render assistance in developing regional economic districts. When the KIC is developed as planned, and additional joint venture projects materialize in other parts of North Korean territory, measures will be taken to form a joint governing institution to coordinate and manage inter-Korean cooperation projects, which will lay the groundwork for an economic community.

Fourth, the KIC has contributed to awakening a sense of national homogeneity and affinity between North and South Koreans, which will be a valuable asset for unification in the future. At the KIC, 54,000 North Korean workers are currently working with some 800 South Korean workers. Managers of South Korean companies there agree the best thing about the KIC is that they use the same language. In addition, they find a lot in common, for instance, in history and culture, despite the fact that seventy years of division has caused many differences and conflicts.

The KIC has provided room for widening mutual understanding and cooperation between the two Koreas. North and South Korean workers are working together and learn more about each other, even though their contacts are somewhat limited. North Koreans, isolated from
the outside world, can witness the life style of South Korean people through working at the KIC. South Korean workers came to know the way of thinking of North Korean workers and their society as a whole.

5. Challenges to a successful model

There are still many hurdles to overcome before the KIC will serve as a model for other special economic zones. First, the KIC has been affected by fluctuating political conditions on the Korean peninsula. It was surprising that the North Korean government withdrew all North Korean workers, halting operation of factories for 160 days in 2013. Kim Yang Gun, head of the United Front Department of the North Korean Workers Party, cited as the reason ‘South Korean government attempts to humiliate (Kim Jong Un’s) ‘supreme dignity’ and to use the industrial district as a spring board for military invasion of the North.’

Even after the KIC resumed its operation, managers of enterprises at the KIC are still concerned that North Korean provocations will cause clients to cancel orders. They hope that stabilized operation will be assured without being impacted by untoward political or military events on the Korean peninsula.

Second, the North Korean authorities should take necessary steps to develop the KIC according to international standard. They should allow South Korean staff and workers to use the internet and cellular phones. They agreed to open the internet for the KIC in August 2013, but little progress has been made in the related working-level talks. They should ease tight

---

9 His statement said, ‘war-mongers of South Korea have humiliated our supreme dignity with malign words like cash cow, detention and hostages.”
controls over transit times and inspections so that people and vehicles can move faster and more conveniently.

North Korea’s reluctance to remove obstacles regarding transit, communications and customs has much to do with its security concerns. North Korea will have to change its dogma of ‘politics overriding economy’ in order to make the KIC more competitive. North Korean authorities need to be pragmatic enough to pay more attention to economic imperatives. In particular, improving conditions for using the internet and cellular phones, and speeding up CIQ procedures are essential to attract foreign investment in the KIC.

Third, enterprises at the KIC seek more stable supply of North Korean workers and independent labor management. There are many firms with lines of machines dormant due to a shortage of workers. These firms have long demanded an additional supply of North Korean labor. In return, North Korea asked the South to build dormitories to accommodate additional workers from regions distant from Kaesong. In addition to building dormitories, conditions for commuting workers living far away will have to be improved, for instance, by repairing roads and highways. Improving surrounding road conditions is also required to transport food stuffs and other materials to the KIC.

North Korean authorities have not allowed South Korean businessmen to manage North Korean workers directly in terms of selection, job instructions and dismissal. Instead, North Korean authorities make unilateral decisions in selecting and firing workers, and job-related instructions and controls are made through North Korean representatives. These issues related to labor freedom will have to be discussed between the two Koreas in order to make the cheap labor force more productive.

Fourth, there should be a more stable legal and institutional framework to prevent North Korea from taking unilateral measures regarding the KIC. In late 2013, North Korea unilaterally revised the Labor Regulation regarding the minimum wage. North Korea tends to levy irrational taxes on enterprises. When the KIC resumed its operation in August 2013, the two Koreas agreed to establish “the North-South Joint Committee for the KIC” and opened a secretariat for the joint committee in September. The Joint Committee held plenary meetings
six times, but needs to convene more frequently to resolve pending issues like wages and communications. In particular, the Joint Committee and its sub-committees will have to improve business conditions and build legal and institutional frameworks to make the industrial complex more stable and competitive.

Fifth, products made in Kaesong need to be designated as “Made-in South Korea” to enhance export competitiveness. KIC products exported to Singapore via South Korea are subject to the same preferential tariffs applied to the goods made in South Korea. With ASEAN, EFTA (European Free Trade Association: Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein), Peru and India FTA, KIC goods are subject to the same tariffs applied to products made in South Korea thanks to the designation of the KIC as an OPZ. In May 2015, South Korea and China agreed that more than 300 products manufactured in the KIC will be given special tariff reductions for export to China. To be eligible, at least 60 percent of each product’s raw materials should come from China or Korea. This agreement will improve the price competitiveness of those exports from Kaesong to China. Vietnam also agreed to designation of the KIC as an OPZ. The South Korean government has been making utmost efforts to get the KIC designated as an OPZ in its negotiations over FTA with the US, EU, Canada and Australia.

6. Conclusion

The KIC is a symbol of an inter-Korean joint economic project that has grown for 10 years. Although it stopped operating for six months in 2013 due to political tension between the two Koreas, the project has survived such critical conflicts as the sinking of the Cheonan vessel. As examined above, the KIC has been a lucrative business model for both South and North Koreans.

It is meaningful that the KIC has contributed to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. The KIC gives a sense of relief and peace to those tourists looking at the industrial park over the tense DMZ from the observatory tower at Mount Dora, located near the road for Kaesong. Every day hundreds of workers and vehicles move peacefully through the heavily armed no-man’s land. At the industrial park, 54,000 North Korean workers are
working together with 800 South Korean workers. North Korean workers enjoy playing volley-balls during break times. 280 South Korean buses run through Kaesong city and neighboring villages to bring North Korean workers to and from the KIC. The construction of the industrial park at previous battle fields near the tense DMZ symbolizes the motto of “swords to ploughshares,” or “Business for Peace.”

Despite obstacles largely related to political and military tension between North and South Korea, the KIC has grown steadily in terms of production volume, and number of operating enterprises and North Korean workers. The two Koreas have established a legal system and institutional framework for stable development of the KIC, albeit much remains to be done.

The KIC is a unique case, for which South Korean developers provided site-grading and infrastructure, including power supply, telecommunications networks, purification and drainage facilities, a waste-water disposal system, and a fire station. South Koreans are in charge of managing the industrial park. It means that the KIC will continue to grow if the South Korean government is willing to do. Undoubtedly, KIC’s future will be affected mostly by North Korean attitude toward the KIC.

As long as North Koreans find the KIC in their interest, the KIC model can be applied to future joint venture projects in Haeju, Nampo and Anbyun. For the Kim Jong Un regime to improve people’s living standard, the KIC will serve as a model for development of 19 regional economic development districts and thus raising the incomes for North Korean workers. To make it better, if North Korea allows products from the KIC to be sold at local markets, the KIC will provide quality goods to North Korean people, just like the Rason Special Economic Zone. If North Korea can afford to provide quality materials and parts, the KIC will be more competitive.

In order for the KIC model to be applied nationwide, the North Korean authorities

---

10 Peace was a key word for the Monday prayer meeting from 1982 to 1989 in Nicholai Church in Leipzig, East Germany. The prayer meeting called for peace under the motto “Schwerter zu Pflugscharen” (Sword to plows).
will have to evaluate the KIC in terms of economic benefits vis-a-vis security costs. If they find more economic benefits, they could delink the KIC from political consideration, and there would be progress in resolving such pending issues as speedy CIQ process and use of the internet and cellular phones. Nevertheless, it would be difficult for the Kim Jong Un regime, whose legitimacy is based on confrontation with the United States and “its puppet”, South Korea. When economic determinants override political consideration in the mindset of the North Korean leadership, the KIC model will prove to be very successful.
DMZ World Eco-Peace Park and Transboundary Conservation as a Start of Cooperation, Peace and Exchange

Dr. PARK Eun-Jin
Head of Future Planning, National Institute of Ecology

1. Introduction

Environmental cooperation and the DMZ (demilitarized zone) conservation have been considered as important issues for promotion of cooperation and peace building in the Korean Peninsula. With no permanent settlements and largely uncultivated, the DMZ area has become a repository of wildlife and representative samples of most of the peninsula’s ecosystems. NGOs, international and scientific organizations have endeavored to promote the establishment of a Park for Peace, building on the conservation value of the DMZ.

The Republic of Korea’s institutions have held a number of events focusing on the DMZ and its future in recent years: an International Conference on Management of DMZ Area for Peace and Ecosystem Conservation took place in 2010; during IUCN’s 2012 World Conservation Congress at Jeju, there was a meeting to promote conservation and peaceful use of the DMZ; a symposium on conservation and peace building in the DMZ took place during the 12th CBD COP (Pyeongchang, 2014), at which Korean government as a host spoke of its

---

1 International Union for Conservation of Nature, the world’s oldest and largest global environmental organization, with more than 1,200 government and NGO Members and almost 11,000 volunteer experts in some 160 countries
hope of building a ‘World Eco-Peace Park’ in the DMZ; finally, the government launched the Peace and Biodiversity Dialogue Initiative during the CBD COP 12 (UNEP/CBD COP 12/INF/30, 2014).

Transboundary conservation can be a way of opening negotiation and communication channels and thus reinforcing and enhancing diplomatic relations between countries (Westing, 1998; McNeely, 2003; Ali, 2010). The reverse, however, is also true; where there is no will to address border disputes between countries, or where agreements have not been ratified, the establishment of transboundary conservation initiatives will be much more difficult.

In this paper, cases of transboundary conservation and their implications will be reviewed to examine whether a transboundary conservation approach is appropriate and necessary for the Korean DMZ. In addition, what visions, strategies and feasible actions are required considering the uniqueness of the DMZ will be discussed.

2. Concept of transboundary conservation and ‘Park for Peace’

Transboundary conservation is a process of cooperation to achieve conservation goals across one or more international boundaries. Ecosystems across the globe are divided by political boundaries, exposed to many different policy, legal and institutional structures, and management regimes. So they are affected by various social, cultural and economic contexts and systems and sometimes impacted by complex relations between countries. Transboundary conservation has emerged as a practical way to overcome these differences and encourage cooperative working across international boundaries so as to achieve shared conservation goals (Vasiljević et al., 2015).

There are three types of transboundary conservation areas: transboundary protected area, transboundary conservation landscape and/or seascape, and transboundary migration conservation area. In addition, a park for peace may be applied to any of the three types of transboundary conservation areas as a special designation. It is dedicated to the promotion
and celebration of peace and cooperation (Table 1).

**Table 1. Type of transboundary conservation area**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type 1</td>
<td>Transboundary Protected Area</td>
<td>A geographical space that includes protected areas that are ecologically connected across one or more international boundaries and involves some form of cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2</td>
<td>Transboundary Conservation Landscape and/or Seascape</td>
<td>An ecologically connected area that includes both protected areas and multiple resource use areas across one or more international boundaries and involves some form of cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 3</td>
<td>Transboundary Migration Conservation Area</td>
<td>Wildlife habitats in two or more countries that are necessary to sustain populations of migratory species and involve some form of cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special designation</td>
<td>Park for Peace</td>
<td>A special designation that may be applied to any of the three types of transboundary conservation areas, and is dedicated to the promotion or celebration of peace and cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IUCN considers the on-going but as-yet unrealized project to create an Eco-Peace Park along the DMZ as an example of a park for peace which could be used to promote peace at some point in future. IUCN has used the term ‘Park for Peace’ ever since 1997, rather than ‘Peace Park’, because ‘Peace Park’ has often been used for situations that are not related to transboundary conservation. For example, some peace parks commemorate battlefields, or are urban parks with no conservation or transboundary context.

According to a research done by Lysenko et al. (2007), there are 227 transboundary conservation areas around the world, adding to surface area of 4.63 million km². The first Park for Peace is Waterton-Glacier International Peace Park in Canada and USA, established in 1932. Transboundary conservation areas are often recognized through several global
intergovernmental agreements/programmes, including the World Heritage Convention\textsuperscript{2}, the UNESCO Man and Biosphere Programme, and Ramsar Convention\textsuperscript{3}. Currently, there are 17 transboundary World Heritage Sites, 14 transboundary Biosphere Reserves, and 16 transboundary Ramar Sites. There have been proposals for designation of the DMZ as a World Heritage Site or a Biosphere Reserve. Southern part of the DMZ and its adjoining areas had been nominated as a Biosphere Reserve in 2012, though it was deferred.

3. Examples of transboundary conservation and their implications

“Grünes Band (Green Belt)” of the United Germany

The borderline between East and West Germany, represented by the Berlin Wall which served as a symbol of the Cold War, is an example which well demonstrates the ideal prototype for the DMZ and what it should aspire to become in later years. The “Iron Barrier” of East and West Germany was constructed, more to prohibit the escape of East German residents, rather than for military purposes. For forty years, the wall has endured severely armed surveillance. However, unlike the DMZ where movement is strictly banned, the borderline of East and West Germany allowed transportation through four highways, ten roads, and nine railroads despite severe surveillance. It was a place of communication and contact where visits between residents, mail exchanges, and watching broadcasts were allowed with different degrees, depending on political circumstances.

Full-scale cooperation began in 1972, as “Inter-German Basic Treaty” was signed, and the “Border Committee”, consisted of representatives of the East German central government and four adjoining provinces of West Germany, was installed in 1973. Various scales of cooperation were made, ranging from managing pollution of the river flowing from the East to the West, management of water resources and energy, to the prevention of natural

\textsuperscript{2} The Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris, 1972
\textsuperscript{3} The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Especially as Waterfowl habitat, Ramsar, 1971
disasters. Before the unification, cooperative businesses were usually funded by West Germany who had more capital and technical resources from higher economic standard.

The status of the border area was radically changed with the reunification in 1989. The natural environment of the German border area could be well protected due to the severe control on human access to and use of the land for decades of the Cold War. After reunification, this borderline has been conserved as the German Green Belt, 1,383 km long and 50-200m wide, by prompt actions of NGOs. It is now expanded to the European Green Belt which is a 12,500 km long strip of land and coastal sea area. It connects 24 countries and its potential as the backbone of a pan-European ecological network is widely recognized. Major parts of the European Green Belt’s pristine landscapes were developed along the former ‘Iron Curtain’, marking the political separation between the former Eastern and Western Blocs. In its four different sections—Fennoscandian, Baltic, Central European and Balkan Green Belt—history has followed different paths, but the common factor is that the existence of the former border zone has left a legacy of remarkable natural values which now form the European Green Belt (Vasilijević et al., 2015).

The German Green Belt is not transboundary conservation area any longer but it projects the future of the DMZ after reunification and implicates the ways of cooperation and conservation before and after reunification. It also implicates the importance of multilateral international cooperation for transboundary conservation in regional level, e.g., for the East Asia Ecological Network.
Ecuador and Peru had several conflicts over the borders of Western Amazon since gaining independence from Spain in the 19th century. Due to an ambiguous borderline at the time of the independence, the two states’ conflicts and warfare to gain crucial passage leading to the Amazon River began in 1828 and repeated and continued on until the peace protocol in 1995. The Park for Peace of Cordillera del Cóndor at the borders of Ecuador-Peru was one of the suggested solutions to the two states’ border conflicts that was concluded with Ecuador giving in to a somewhat unfavorable proposal and instead securing the navigation rights for the Peruvian Amazon River’s Northern tributary and property rights for the 1 km² of land within the Peruvian borders where the military base was located.

The Cordillera del Cóndor is home to many endangered species including the Andean Condors which has wings over 3m. In 1999 the two nations Ecuador and Peru, with the help of The International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) and other international
organizations, established a total 16,425.7 ㎢ of Park for Peace, including the El Condor National Park in the Ecuadorian region and Santiago-Comaina Reserved Zone in the Peruvian region. The Peace Park of Cordillera del Cóndor is a rare case of a direct symbol of conflict resolution and peaceful reconciliation. With the guarantee of joint management and free passage it has contributed to the peace settlement of the two states and became a good opportunity to secure the practical gains of joint resource usage.

Figure 2. Cordillera del Cóndor at the borders of Ecuador-Peru¹) (left), view of the Cordillera del Condor²) (center), and Andean Condors³)

Source : 1) Park et al. (2012); 2) Page of Missouri Botanical Garden (http://www.mobot.org); 3) Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/)
Twin Parks and Friendship Parks in Finland-Russia

Finland has maintained a hostile yet non-confrontational relationship with Russia after its independence from Russia in 1917, invasion from the Soviet in 1939, and cease-fire agreement in 1944. The bordering region of Finland and Russia is a taiga natural forest area with almost no residents thus was not referred to as “The Iron Curtain” but traffic was strictly restricted. Today as borderline of the EU, traffic is made only via the border checkpoint, however other areas are distinguished by barbed fences and still strictly regulated.

The Russian border region is especially known for its biological diversity and taiga natural forests and lakes, internationally recognized as high conservation values. In the 1990s as Russia concentrated on timber production and the taiga natural forests were exposed to risk of timbering and damage, the international community’s protection efforts and cooperation for scientific research was called for. Following the borders 14 reservations in Finland and 6 in Russia were designated, and Friendship Parks and Twin Parks were specially established in 3 regions for bilateral cooperation. With the support of the EU the two nations have been presenting active mutual research cooperation and exchange workshops through each nation designating cooperation agencies and establishing annual plans. Also, by extending the connection of the European Greenbelt

Figure 3. The protected areas at the borderland of Finland-Russia and cooperation parks

Source: Park et al. (2012)
that began in Germany to the Finland-Russian borderland protection areas, a European-level cooperation was also strengthened.

This case implicates the plausibility of establishing friendship parks or twin parks at the neighboring areas of the DMZ and building up scientific research and tourism. For example, the Seorak-Kumgang Mountains, the biosphere reserves of the Kuwol Mountains-Gwangneung Forest, the estuary of the Han River- Yeseong River are each possible suggestions as cooperational friendship parks.

4. Uniqueness of the Korean DMZ and feasibility of transboundary conservation

It is important to recognize that unlike other transboundary areas, the DMZ in Korean Peninsula is not a cause of conflict but a result of it. It is typically the case that transboundary conservation areas play the role of peace parks as a response to resource competition or protection. However, the Korean DMZ is the result of ideological conflict from the Cold War and is not itself a target for resource competition or protection. This means that the possibility of cooperation within the DMZ depends on the resolution of political conflicts.

The second uniqueness is that the conflict around the DMZ is more severe than ever. Transboundary conservation areas for dialogue and cooperation have been successfully established where the political tension wasn’t as intense and rigid. It is difficult to find any successful case of transboundary conservation or peace parks in such an armed conflict situation. This also implies that it is possible to bring the issue of transboundary conservation to the table symbolically by alleviation of political rigidity. In summary, the topic of transboundary conservation in Korean Peninsula demands change in such a volatile political situation as a prerequisite and it is necessary to make it clear its complete dependency.

The third distinctive aspect is that the DMZ is a temporary conflict zone in a nation with a relatively short history of separation rather than a border area between two countries.
with different histories. In other words, it is a temporarily restricted area with potential instability and mutability, thus anticipating (eventual) reunification rather than being a permanent transboundary of peaceful division. The future vision of the DMZ has not been clearly determined because of its present military function, and this leads many stakeholders to sketch different visions for it.

Now it is important to review whether transboundary conservation is possible within the DMZ. According to the definition and benefits of transboundary conservation, it is really needed within or at neighboring area of the DMZ. However, regarding applicability, realization is difficult at this moment because of political tension and the uniqueness of the DMZ.

The DMZ is definitely a global symbol of peace and conservation. It is a living historical remnant of the Cold War, as well as being a wildlife refuge and biodiversity repository made by fortuity, with valuable tourism resources. Most importantly, there is enthusiastic social awareness and aspiration to establish the DMZ as a global symbol of peace and conservation.

However, as mentioned previously, transboundary conservation cooperation is not ready to start. Political will and negotiation to remove military tension must first come as prerequisites. Though transboundary conservation cooperation within the DMZ cannot start as a trigger to alleviate tension, it is possible as a symbolic result or catalyst of peace building with political negotiation.

5. Approach for a Park for Peace and transboundary conservation

Saleem Ali (2007), who has introduced a diverse range of cases and theories of peace parks (“Parks for Peace) explains that up to now most peace parks have been created in places without severe conflicts and environmental cooperation with the creation of peace parks is possible after a minimum alleviation of conflict. However peace parks can be
important starting points for discussion even in situations of harsh conflicts of ideologies, and provide solutions to situations of difficult stalemates by attracting international attention. A more flexible approach should be applied to transboundary conservation and cooperation as a prompt response to the political situation resulting in instability and change in the DMZ. It is imperative that the process from rigid political situation to reunification through eventual alleviation is supported by expandable and feasible plans and practices.

Future vision of the DMZ considering these unique aspects of the DMZ should be set first. Until reunification, the DMZ can and ought to be “a park for peace and transboundary conservation area” pursuing reunification as the ultimate end, not just the stable and peaceful maintenance of a divided nation. After reunification, it should naturally transition into “a natural peace memorial park” like the German Green Belt. It can be a conservation area for exploring and learning nature, history, and culture. And it can be also a model area of sustainable development to refurbish a reunified Korea from devastated lands and lives.

With these future visions, what should be done now? First, conservation cooperation should start in adjoining areas of the DMZ. It is essential to establish trust and improve political relations and to connect ecological corridors and habitats of wildlife species across the DMZ, and to get more countries involved through multilateral environment agreements, for example by reinforcing East Asia Ecological Network including DPRK, Japan, China, and Russia. As the DMZ and its adjoining areas are important habitat for red-crown cranes, spoonbills, and other endangered species, conservation and restoration of these habitats in adjoining area avoiding military sensitivity will be a symbolic and scientific cooperation to build trust each other.

Secondly, a successful system to share and achieve such a vision should be prepared initially in S. Korea, to be eventually expand and N. Korea should be included. In the hypothetical aftermath of reunification, it is essential to remove and prevent confusion and conflicts resulting from different expectations. With this step-by-step approach, more efforts and endeavors should be taken in order to procure an elaborate governance system and participation process of stakeholders. This expandable step-by-step approach can be applied
for the designation of a biosphere reserve along the DMZ.

Thirdly, legal and institutional systems for conservation should also develop first in adjoining areas of the DMZ in S. Korea. In order to establish legal protected areas, additional ecological surveys and assessments should be conducted to provide scientific basis and reliability for decision-makers. At the same time, it is important to support benefit programs coupled with, for example, eco-tourism and improving the quality of life for local community. Lastly, it is very essential to make feasible plans for successful fulfill of many pilot projects in small areas and to expand by networking to achieve a vision of sustainable development in the CCZ first. It is necessary to resume the designation of a Biosphere Reserve for smaller model areas in the CCZ rather than for a whole area as proposed in 2012. With this, more efforts should be taken to strengthen capacity building for local governments and communities, and should develop knowledge of ecosystem services and benefits with pilot projects.

It is important to take one step forward in finding a right way to reduce ‘conflicts’ between the two Koreas under the cloud of unpredictability, and simultaneously dealing with another ‘conflicts’ between conservation and economic development in our society through DMZ conservation.
References


Page of Missouri Botanical Garden (http://www.mobot.org)

Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/)
OSCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA?

Dr. Dorjraa MUNKHTUR
Chief, Institute for Strategic Studies, Mongolia

The OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) is the largest regional organization in the world and it has 57 participating states, including all European States, the CIS states, the USA, Canada, and Mongolia. This Organization advocates not only military security but also human rights, minority rights, and other issues relating to European comprehensive security. The OSCE is an inclusive and consensus-based organization; it provides a platform for permanent, structured dialogue; it applies a comprehensive approach to security; and it has developed tools for conflict prevention and resolution.

In 2012, Mongolia was admitted to officially participate in the OSCE, as the first example of the new full-fledged participating states which was not of the former CSCE area. Examples such as Chairing the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, hosting OSCE Conference on the role of armed and security forces in democratic societies are showing Mongolia’s active and effective participation. The 2015 Autumn Meeting of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly will be held on 15-18 September in Ulaanbaatar.

- OCSE’s experience could be an inspiration to promoting security and cooperation in Asia
OSCE attaches great importance to its relations with Asian Partners. Both in the Euro-Atlantic / Eurasian area and in the Asia Pacific, security issues have become more pressing lately. The risk of political and military polarization is growing in both regions. There are multitude of crises around the globe and challenges that no state can cope with on its own. Despite every objection the OSCE’s crucial role as a bridge-builder and an agent of peace is recognized today. The crisis in Ukraine highlighted the eminent role the OSCE can play for peace and security in Europe.

The community of values like OSCE is the highest community of values which the OSCE proclaimed itself in 1990s, implying the possible security model in Asia. The OSCE could be not only a bridge between Europe and Asia, it can also be a source of inspiration in efforts to strengthen trust and cooperation among countries in the Asia Pacific. The Helsinki Final Act and the OSCE model of regional security cannot simply be exported, but rather its ideas, values and learn once lessons from its history. As Europe’s experience has shown, building trust by cultivating a habit of dialogue, cooperation and compromise takes a time, requires efforts of all participants.

- “Helsinki of the East?”

Countries in the NEA region, in particular Mongolia and Korea, made proposals for establishing a formal security cooperation mechanism: Ulaanbaatar Dialogue on Northeast Asian security /UBD/ and The Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative /NAPCI/.

The Mongolian initiative of UBD has the same goal of promoting regional confidence and mutual understanding though open dialogue. UBD has no intention to compete against or substitute Six-Party Talks, nor the NAPCI. Both NAPCI and the UB Dialogue seek to chip away at distrust among Northeast Asian countries and increase collaboration and cooperation through multi-layered activities, including mutually reinforcing Track 1, 1.5 and 2 gatherings. Both emphasize multilateral cooperation on non-traditional security issues and people-to-people exchanges as ways to help build trust and resolve regional problems step by step. There is no
reason why the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue and NAPCI cannot be complementary and mutually reinforcing.

Building confidence and mutual understanding is not an easy task, especially in the highly polarized region like NEA. Mongolians have a saying “Want go fast – go alone. Want go far – go together”. Mongolians want to cover the distance, where every NEA nation cooperates and is consulted on security challenges and issues they face, which may look far from today’s standpoint and want to go together to effectively overcome this distance.